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Abstract
Most intrusion detection systems rely on signature matching of known malware or
anomaly discrimination by data mining historical network traffic. This renders defended
systems vulnerable to new or polymorphic code and deceptive attacks that do not trigger
anomaly alarms. A lightweight, self-aware intrusion detection system (IDS) is essential
for the security of government and commercial networks, especially mobile, ad-hoc
networks (MANETs) with relatively limited processing power. This research proposes a
host-based, anomaly discrimination IDS using operating system process parameters to
measure the “health” of individual systems. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is
employed for feature set selection and dimensionality reduction, while Mahalanobis
Distance (MD) and is used to classify legitimate and illegitimate activity. This
combination of statistical methods provides an efficient computer operating process
anomaly intrusion detection system (PAIDS) that maximizes detection rate and
minimizes false positive rate, while updating its sense of “self” in near-real-time.
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HOST-BASED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL COMPUTER OPERATING
PROCESS ANOMALY INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (PAIDS)

I.
1.1

Background

Introduction
Methods of cyberattack are limited only by human ingenuity, but most attacks

take advantage of code vulnerabilities, the inherent trust architecture of Internet protocol,
or insecure habits of users and administrators. Cyberattacks vary in form from denial of
service to scanning/probing to penetration, and emanate from a wide range of sources
from pranksters to organized criminals to nation states. “As systems become more
complex, there are always exploitable weaknesses due to design and programming errors,
or through the use of various “socially engineered” penetration techniques.” (Khan,
Awad, & Thuraisingham, 2007) The goal of cyberdefense in general, and an intrusion
detection system (IDS) in particular, is to limit the impact of these inherent weaknesses,
so that attacks are either thwarted outright or inflict the least amount of damage possible.
“The task of preventing unauthorized users from compromising the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of sensitive information, is increasingly difficult
in the face of the growth in Internet use, the increasing skill levels of attackers
themselves, and technological advances in their tools and methods of attack.” (GAO,
1996) Thus, it is increasingly likely that attacks will be successful and go unnoticed.
Assuming that any system is “crackable” by a determined adversary, the only way to
mitigate an attack is through early detection and isolation. Due to the diversity of attack
avenues, commercial and government administrators struggle to defend themselves in a
1

constantly changing environment. IDSs have emerged as essential tools to ensure
security against these emerging threats.
1.2

What is an intrusion?
An intrusion is any use of a computer or network for which the user either does

not have privileges or authorization. It could be a penetration by an outsider or misuse by
an insider, and the result could be denial, alteration, or theft of data. The types of
intrusion have changed very little since Dorothy Denning’s seminal work, An Intrusion
Detection Model (1986), which lists examples of intrusions and indicators:
Intrusion Type
Attempted
break-in

Possible Indicators
•
•

Masquerading
or successful
break-in

•

Penetration by
legitimate user

•

Leakage by
legitimate user
Inference by
legitimate user
Trojan Horse

•

•
•
•
•

Virus

•

Denial of
Service

•

High rate of password failures with respect to a single account or the
system as a whole
[High rate of port access requests on a single host (portscan) or
across a network (portsweep)]
Different login time, location, or connection type from the account’s
legitimate user
Different behavior pattern from legitimate user (browsing directories
or executing system status commands vs. editing or compiling
programs)
User executes different programs or triggers more protection
violations from attempts to access unauthorized files or programs
User will have access to commands and files not normally permitted
Unusual login times or data routed to remote printers [or hosts] not
normally used
A user attempts to retrieve more records than usual in an attempt to
aggregate or infer unauthorized data
Behavior of planted or substituted program may differ from
legitimate program in terms of its CPU time or I/O activity
Increase in frequency of executable files rewritten, storage used by
executable files, or a particular program being executed
Abnormally high resource activity with respect to a particular user
while activity for all other users is abnormally low

Table 1 – Intrusions and Indicators (Denning, 1986)
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What makes these intrusions so difficult to detect is that “aberrant usage can also
be linked with actions unrelated to security. They could be a sign of a user changing
work tasks, acquiring new skills, or making typing mistakes, software updates, or
changing workload on a system.” (Denning, 1986) Distinguishing between abnormal
legitimate and illegitimate behavior is therefore very challenging. Also, intruders are
able to test the limits of an IDS to determine its characteristics, and then attempt to
appear as normal as possible to avoid tripping alarms.
“The number of incidents reported by federal agencies to the [U.S. - Computer
Emergency Readiness Team] US-CERT has increased dramatically over the past 3 years,
increasing from 3,634 incidents reported in fiscal year 2005 to 13,029 incidents in fiscal
year 2007.” (GAO, 2008) The most prevalent attacks for FY07 are presented in Figure 1,
where “investigation” indicates unconfirmed incidents that are potentially malicious or
anomalous activity deemed by the reporting entity to warrant further review.

Figure 1 – Percentage of incidents reported to US-CERT in FY07 (GAO, 2008)
3

1.3

What is malware?
Often when an intrusion occurs, whether from an internal or external source, the

intent of attacker is to install some malicious code, known as malware, which will
function either autonomously or with some human interaction to perform a desired task.
The task could be annoying, such as sending an advertising email to everyone in the
victim’s address book (a common goal of spammers) or it could be more insidious such
as opening a backdoor to allow future unhindered attacks.
Like all software, the functionality of malware is only limited by the creativity of
the programmer. However, malware generally falls into distinguishable categories of
form and function. Each type of malware has a specific purpose, with associated
strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and limitations. The discussion of cyberwarfare is
easier when these terms, shown in Table 2, are used correctly (a Trojan is not a virus) but
unfortunately many malware programs are combinations that defy simple classification.
Malware Type

Defining Characteristics

Virus

•

Worm

•

Malicious
Mobile Code
Backdoor
Trojan Horse

•

User-Level
Rootkit
Kernel-Level
Rootkit
Combination

•

•
•

•
•

Does not self-replicate, usually requires human interaction to spread
from host to host, either through removable media or network
Self-replicates, usually does not require human interaction to spread
across a network
Lightweight programs that are downloaded from a remote system
and executed locally with minimal or no user intervention
Bypasses normal security controls to give an attacker access
Disguises itself as a useful program while masking hidden malicious
purposes
Replaces or modifies executable programs used by system
administrators and users
Manipulates the heart of the operating system, the kernel, to hide
and create backdoors
Combines various techniques listed above to increase effectiveness

Table 2 – Taxonomy of Malware (Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004)
4

1.4

Who is the threat?
Threats can come from anywhere at any time, but who is most likely to initiate a

cyberattack? Table 3 presents a partial list of the potential perpetrators.
Threat source
Criminal groups

Description
There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by
criminal groups that attack systems for monetary
gain.
Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part
of their information gathering and espionage
activities. Also, several nations are aggressively
working to develop information warfare doctrine,
programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable
a single entity to have a significant and serious
impact by disrupting the supply, communications,
and economic infrastructures that support military
power—impacts that, according to the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, can affect the daily lives
of Americans across the country.
Hackers sometimes crack into networks for the thrill
of the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker
community. While remote cracking once required a
fair amount of skill or computer knowledge, hackers
can now download attack scripts and protocols from
the Internet and launch them against victim sites.
Thus, attack tools have become more sophisticated
and easier to use.
Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on
publicly accessible Web pages or e-mail servers.
These groups and individuals overload e-mail
servers and hack into Web sites to send a political
message.
The disgruntled insider, working from within an
organization, is a principal source of computer
crimes. Insiders may not need a great deal of
knowledge about computer intrusions because their
knowledge of a victim system often allows them to
gain unrestricted access to cause damage to the
system or to steal system data. The insider threat
also includes contractor personnel.
Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit
critical infrastructures to threaten national security,
cause mass casualties, weaken the U.S. economy,
and damage public morale and confidence.
However, traditional terrorist adversaries of the
United States are less developed in their computer
network capabilities than other adversaries.
Terrorists likely pose a limited cyber threat. The
Central Intelligence Agency believes terrorists will
stay focused on traditional attack methods, but it
anticipates growing cyber threats as a more
technically competent generation enters the ranks.

Foreign nation states

Hackers

Hacktivists

Disgruntled insiders

Terrorists

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, unless otherwise indicated.

Table 3 – Cyber Threats to Federal Systems and Critical Infrastructures (GAO, 2008)
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Clearly, the list of adversaries is extensive, but how often are these attacks
successful? In a 1996 report (Information Security - Computer Attacks at Department of
Defense Pose Increasing Risk), the GAO reported
DISA estimates indicate that Defense may have been attacked as
many as 250,000 times last year. However, the exact number is not
known because, according to DISA, only about 1 in 150 attacks is
actually detected and reported. In addition, in testing its systems,
DISA attacks and successfully penetrates Defense systems 65
percent of the time. According to Defense officials, attackers have
obtained and corrupted sensitive information--they have stolen,
modified, and destroyed both data and software. They have
installed unwanted files and "back doors" which circumvent
normal system protection and allow attackers unauthorized access
in the future. They have shut down and crashed entire systems and
networks, denying service to users who depend on automated
systems to help meet critical missions. Numerous Defense
functions have been adversely affected, including weapons and
supercomputer research, logistics, finance, procurement, personnel
management, military health, and payroll.
In the last decade, the frequency and sophistication of attack vectors has
increased, while the knowledge required to use them has decreased, thus exposing
computer systems to a constantly expanding threat. Recently in Estonia and
Georgia, cyberattacks were used in conjunction with physical attacks to cripple
the response of their respective governments. Whether these attacks were
initiated by state run agencies or merely “hacktivists” is irrelevant, the important
point is that they were highly effective. We are not entirely defenseless, however,
and our safeguards have also increased considerably, primarily in the realm of
security awareness and access control.

6

1.5

The first line of defense
Multiple levels of security are necessary for a truly secure network. Physical

security can be considered the first layer of security. This consists of not allowing
unauthorized users physical access to secure computers or networks, such as keeping
them sequestered in a vault with no connection to the Internet. However, this can
severely limit the utility of the system and is often not worth the inconvenience.
Another frontline measure is operational security (OPSEC), which can be as
simple as not associating certain pieces of information together which, when combined,
reveal a secret or vulnerability. Keeping passwords secure, limiting distribution of
critical information, and restricting access to “need to know” are all examples of OPSEC.
AFDD 2-5 -- Information Operations (11 January 2005) states that Operations Security is
“not a collection of specific rules and instructions that can be applied to every operation,
it is a methodology that can be applied to any operation or activity for the purpose of
denying critical information to the adversary. Critical information consists of data and
indicators that are sensitive, but unclassified. OPSEC aims to identify any unclassified
activity or information that, when analyzed with other activities and information, can
reveal protected and important friendly operations, information, or activities.” OPSEC is
everyone's responsibility, and is an important aspect of intrusion prevention.
Information security awareness training also plays a large role in maintaining the
integrity of a computer network. Often, users are simply unaware that their actions are
potentially harmful or may compromise a system. “Users need to know the simple things
that they can do to help to prevent intrusions, cyber attacks, or other security breaches.

7

All users of cyberspace have some responsibility, not just for their own security, but also
for the overall security and health of cyberspace.” (NIAC 2003) Administrators can go a
long way towards protecting their system by merely educating users on basic security
measures and enforcing their implementation. Evidence that awareness of the threat is
improving can be seen by comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2; the fact that more attempted
intrusions and much less improper usage was reported in 2008 is encouraging.
If these doctrinal methods are insufficient, as they often are, the traditional “first
layer” of defense in computer security comes into effect – electronic security measures.
Some examples of these include: passwords and firewalls; authorization limits, such as
administrator and user rights; and cryptologic devices to encode files and message traffic.
This is the level at which people generally start thinking about network security, although
most intrusions can be foiled at the physical and operational level long before they
become a technological problem.

Figure 2 – Percentage of incidents reported to US-CERT in FY08 Q4 (USCERT, 2008)
8

1.6

What is an IDS?
Intrusion detection systems are the second (or third, or fourth) layer of defense, to

notify administrators when the first line of defense has been penetrated or is being
probed. The idea of an IDS is “based on the hypothesis that exploitation of a system’s
vulnerabilities involves abnormal use of the system; therefore, security violations could
be detected from abnormal patterns of system usage.” (Denning, 1986) Most IDSs
attempt to parse network traffic data into a characteristic feature set that includes
information such as: type and amount of data transferred; time, frequency, and depth of
access; and source/destination Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)
addresses. Although parsing network traffic is highly effective for identifying intrusions,
it is increasingly difficult to characterize this data, especially in mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs) with highly dynamic topologies.
Intrusion detection systems can either be network-based or host-based. The
majority of commercial IDSs are network-based, but these are not useful for busy
networks, cannot analyze encrypted data, and cannot tell if an attack was successful.
(Mell, et al., 2003) The primary concerns for a host-based IDS are its susceptibility to
attack and its reliance on the computing power of the device. “An attacker that is able to
circumvent the security of the IDS could cause it to issue a large number of false
negatives, effectively carrying out a denial of service attack, or could cause its detectors
to malfunction.” (Merkle, et al., 2002) Although this research is concentrated at the host
level, the resulting algorithm could be used as part of a multi-layered network-based IDS.
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Intrusion detection systems generally fall into two categories, anomaly detection
(profile-matching) and misuse detection (signature-matching), although these types can
be combined to form a specification-based system. Standard anti-virus software is
typically based on signature matching of previously identified malware code, and this is
still the most effective method to detect known attacks. However, since new malware is
being created faster than patches can be deployed to signature libraries and much of it is
polymorphic (self-mutating), regardless of how often they are updated there is no chance
of predicting what the next code will look like. Only anomaly detection is capable of
identifying new types of attacks, because the IDS is looking for malevolent behavior or
system reactions instead of attempting to recognize known code strings or network traffic
patterns. Obviously, the strongest defense would include both types of IDS at multiple
layers of the network. This research will use statistical methods of multivariate analysis
to identify anomalies in operating system processes, thus retaining the ability to detect
intrusions regardless of the vector.
However, anomaly detection can also pose challenges, as it generally requires
training at both normal and abnormal operating conditions. The anomaly detection IDS
must be taught to recognize its normal “self” and distinguish it from an abnormal “other”
state. The problem can be simplified by only training to one condition and assuming that
anything not in that category is in the other, but this can lead to false positives if, for
instance, a rare occurrence is not in the training data. “The capacity of a certain
environment to be self-aware is equivalent to the capacity to detect novelties emerging
inside the environment itself.” (Balducelli, et al., 2007) There are various methods
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proposed in the literature to classify anomalies in this way, including discriminant
analysis (DA), decision trees, support vector machines (SVM), and genetic algorithms
(GA). The major obstacle to building an anomaly detection system is establishing
normality and finding the most effective feature set to expose abnormal conditions.
1.7

A host-based, statistical anomaly IDS proposal
Signature-based IDSs are very good at recognizing attacks which have been

previously identified, but are unable to detect an attack for which no pattern has been
determined. Likewise, network-based IDSs are necessary to detect distributed attacks,
but often cannot ascertain what is happening at the individual component level. This
research proposes that a host-based statistical anomaly IDS is necessary to defend against
“zero day” attacks targeted at individual computer systems. In addition, this research will
show that an IDS can be designed using local operating system process data such as:
percentage of kernel and total CPU used; number of threads, handles, and windows open
in a process; and number and size of read/write operations. The results of this research
will be referred to as a process anomaly intrusion detection system (PAIDS).
Using this type of data is similar to measuring temperature, blood pressure, white
blood count, etc. in a human patient. Although we may not be able to tell what kind of
sickness (intrusion) is occurring, or where it is coming from, we can determine that
something is wrong and take further action. Edward Amoroso calls this method pattern
matching and suggests that it “constitutes an especially powerful approach because it
provides intrusion detection capability for attacks that might not be predictable. In fact,
human operators might detect subtle changes that they can neither explain nor
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understand.” (1999, p. 65) An added benefit to using this type of data to characterize an
intrusion is that it may aid in detecting intrusions using removable media or other direct
methods, which analysis of network traffic cannot do. Although some intrusions, such as
rootkit attacks, may subvert some of this data, the effects of these attacks should still be
measurable in a multi-dimensional feature space.
By collecting a wide range of variables, we can then use multivariate statistical
methods to detect anomalies in these processes, and then classify the abnormal states as
either legitimate activity or an illegitimate intrusion. Most IDSs collect features based on
network traffic to classify intrusions instead of “state of health” information directly from
the host operating system. By monitoring operating system behavior and hardware data,
PAIDS can develop a sense of “self” and detect anomalies in this representation which is
not vulnerable to standard code deception techniques generally employed by cyber
attackers. This sense of “self” contains certain characteristics described by an Air Force
Research Laboratory and Air Force Institute of Technology working group called the
Qualia Exploitation of Sensor Technology (QuEST) headed by Dr. Steven Rogers:
1. Continuity – unbroken thread with a cohesive non-causal narrative of
past, present and future
2. Unity – sensor data is diverse, but is experienced by a single “mind”
3. Embodiment – “mind” is anchored in a “body” that is embedded in an
environment from which sensory experience is taken
4. Sense of Free Will – the environment can be manipulated as a result of
actions taken by the “body” determined by the “mind”
5. Reflection – “mind” is aware of itself as a separate entity inside a
world model
PAIDS assumes an uncompromised “self” at installation and during the start-up
process, but this is an unavoidable requirement in any IDS.
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1.8

Optimization
The most important aspect of optimizing intrusion detection is determining a

subset of data to analyze that minimizes false positives (declaring an attack when there is
none) and false negatives (not detecting a real attack) while maximizing true positives
(detecting a real attack). Since there is a vast amount of data available to the analyst,
even an automatic system is quickly overwhelmed. The challenge is to find the smallest
feature set which still provides useful information. Two primary statistical methods for
dimension reduction are Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Factor Analysis (FA).
Both of these methods use linear combinations of variables to cluster data and capture the
most variance of the original data in the smallest subset possible. Once an anomaly has
been identified in the smaller dimensional space, an analyst can investigate the incident
further to determine the nature of the intrusion.
Another problem with anomaly detection in the computer environment is the
highly variable range of normal operating values, which makes identification of “self”
challenging. Standard anomaly detection algorithms have difficulty with this because
they are based on a static measurement of historical data, which leads to a high false
positive rate. “Historically, minimizing the false positive rate has been a major goal of
algorithm designers.” (Fox, Kiciman, & Patterson, 2004) Typically, designers are only
able to attain low false positives by lowering the true positive rate as well. PAIDS is able
to update its control limits and feature set in near-real-time, thus allowing it to recognize
shifts in conditions caused either by normal operations or by low level attacks.
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II.
2.1

Literature Review

Intrusion Detection Categorization
“Hundreds of megabytes of data are collected every second that are of interest to

computer security professionals. … What we need are systems that perform data mining
at various levels on this corpus of data in order to ease the burden of the human analyst.
… Systems that do this type of data mining for security information fall under the
classification of intrusion detection systems.” (Brugger, et al., 2001) Intrusion detection
experts stress that an IDS is not an autonomous device, but a set of procedures to aid a
trained analyst. For instance, Stephen Northcutt states, “Intrusion detection is best
thought of as a capability, not a single tool. ... Even the best intrusion detection system
will be blind to an attack that it is not programmed to detect.” (1999, p. 16) Edward
Amoroso offers, “Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and responding to
malicious activity targeted at computing and networking resources.” (1999, p. 16)
(emphasis added)
Amoroso goes on to identify five methods for intrusion detection (pp. 21-25):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Audit trail processing
On-the-fly processing
Profiles of normal behavior
Profiles of abnormal behavior
Parameter pattern matching.

In general, however, the computer security community has defined two levels for
intrusion detection – at the host or on the network, and three major types of detectors –
signature, anomaly, or specification-based. There are advantages and disadvantages to
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each of these, and the strongest defense is obviously multi-layered using all types of IDS.
Some discussion of previously suggested IDS implementation follows.
2.1.1

Host-Based

A host-based IDS resides on individual systems, and either reports data to a
consolidated analysis center to be processed, or processes the data itself and performs
automatic responses to detected intrusions. Anti-virus software on a personal computer is
a good example of a host-based IDS. “Performing analysis strictly at the host level has
the advantage of minimizing network load. However, it has the disadvantage of not
allowing the detection of broad scale attacks targeting a network of machines (for
instance, an attacker sequentially hopping through a network performing brute force
password guessing against each host.)” (Bace, 2000) A host-based IDS is best suited for
high activity systems, or whose compromise would pose a serious risk to operations. “At
the very least, host-based intrusion detection code should be deployed on all server
systems, as well as corporate officers and other key personnel.” (Northcutt, 1999, p. 16)
One major problem, “with the host-based IDS is the high processing overhead
that they impose on their host.” (Kabiri & Ghorbani, 2005) This can be significant for
MANETs or wireless sensor networks where according to da Silva, et al. (2005) “nodes
are designed to be cheap and small, [so] they do not have enough hardware resources.
Thus, the available memory may not be sufficient to create a detection log.” Various
schemes have been developed to avoid this problem, such as elected monitors for a
cluster of nodes (Huang & Lee, 2003), a multi-layered collaborative approach to intrusion
detection at both host and network level (Yongguang, Wenke, & Huang, 2003), or
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through the use of multivariate statistical techniques to reduce the dimensionality of the
data to be analyzed. (Chen, et al., 2007) The latter technique will be used in this research
to limit the impact on a host's processing capabilities.
Another disadvantage of a host-based IDS is “operating system vulnerabilities can
undermine the integrity of host-based agents and analyzers.” (Bace, 2000) In other
words, attacks that target the operating system upon which the host-based IDS resides,
such as a rootkit attack, might subvert the operation of the IDS itself. Of course, network
IDSs are susceptible to this as well. Mell, et al. (2003) describe several attacks:
1. Sending a large amount of non-attack traffic with volume exceeding
the IDS’s processing capability. With too much traffic to process, an
IDS may drop packets and be unable to detect attacks.
2. Sending to the IDS non-attack packets that are specially crafted to
trigger many signatures within the IDS, thereby overwhelming the
IDS’s human operator with false positives or crashing alert processing
or display tools.
3. Sending to the IDS a large number of attack packets intended to
distract the IDS’s human operator while the attacker instigates a real
attack hidden under the “smokescreen” created by the multitude of
other attacks.
4. Sending to the IDS packets containing data that exploit a vulnerability
within the IDS processing algorithms. Such attacks will only be
successful if the IDS contains a known coding error that can be
exploited by a clever attacker. Fortunately, very few IDSs have had
known exploitable buffer overflows or other vulnerabilities.
One way to mitigate the risk to individual hosts is by keeping the signature-based
operating system service pack updated to “patch” known code vulnerabilities so they are
no longer susceptible to known attacks. Another more difficult method of avoiding this
risk is to incorporate the IDS into the operating system software itself such as the latest
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attempts by Microsoft in its Vista platform, or by designing an inherently more secure
operating system, such as the multi-level security access structure proposed by Bell and
LaPadula. (1973) Since PAIDS works in a multivariate feature space and the feature set
is capable of change in near-real-time, it is less susceptible to deception than other hostbased IDSs.
2.1.2

Network-Based

A network-based IDS is one in which “a distributed system will protect the
network as a whole. In this architecture the IDS might control or monitor network
firewalls, network routers or network switches as well as the client machines.” (Kabiri &
Ghorbani, 2005) A network IDS will generally record and parse network traffic data
with monitoring agents, then either let these nodes process the data or report the data to a
centrally located decision node.

Figure 3 – Example Network Intrusion Monitor Locations (da Silva, et al., 2005)
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A network-based IDS can reside either inside or outside a firewall, but as
Northcutt states, “if your network-based IDS is located outside your firewall, you would
never see an internal attack.” (p. 21) Depending on the level of security desired and the
resources available, there will be multiple IDS monitors in a variety of locations (Figure
3) to ensure the maximum exposure while minimizing the distance between sensors and a
possible intruder.
An IDS is defined by the measurements it makes and the rules it applies to these
measurements. Though rules vary, there are standard intrusions which can be detected
with a typical rule set such as those described in Table 4 for wireless networks.
Rule

Description

Attack Detected

Time between receipt of two
•
consecutive messages is larger
or smaller than allowed limits •

Interval

Retransmission Tampered node does not
forward received message
Integrity

Delay
Repetition

Radio
Transmission
Jamming

•

Check to make sure message
payload is the same along the
entire network path
Retransmission does not occur
before a defined timeout
Same message can only be
retransmitted only a limited
number of times
Messages must originate from
at most one hop away

•

Number of collisions must be
lower than an expected value

•

•
•
•
•

Negligence – Intruder does not
send data from tampered node
Exhaustion – intruder increments
sending rate to increase energy
consumption of neighbors
Blackhole/Selective Forwarding –
Intruder suppresses some or all
messages from retransmission
Modification – Intruder
aggregates or otherwise modifies
contents of a received message
Blackhole
Negligence
Denial of Service – Intruder
attempts to monopolize node
resource
Wormhole/Helloflood – Intruder
sends message to far located node
to increase energy consumption
Jamming – Intruder introduces
noise to disturb communications

Table 4 – Typical Network-based IDS Rules (da Silva, et al., 2005)
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Of course, network-based IDSs also have disadvantages. “Network agents can
monitor and detect network attacks (e.g. SYN flood and packet storm attacks). … [but]
… Although some network-based systems can infer from network traffic what is
happening on hosts, they cannot tell the outcome of commands executed on the host.
This is an issue in detection, when distinguishing between user error and malfeasance.”
(Bace, 2000) Thus, a fully protected network will still need some form of host-based
intrusion detection.
One of the major setbacks to a network IDS is the amount of network traffic
generated by the monitoring agents. For instance, one of the earliest efforts at a networkbased IDS, the Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS), developed by Snapp, et
al. (1991) had scalability issues…“the data flow between host monitors and the director
agent may generate significantly high network traffic overheads.” (Shyu, et al., 2007)
2.1.3

Signature-Based

Despite the best efforts of computer scientists, “any computer system or network
has known vulnerabilities that an intruder can exploit. However, it is more efficient to
detect intrusions that exploit these known vulnerabilities through the use of explicit
expert system rules than through statistical anomaly detection.” (Anderson, Frivold, &
Valdes, 1995) The rules that detect previously identified exploitations are known as
signatures. These signatures can be code strings, sequences of events, or other patterns
indicative of malware. “Signatures are patterns corresponding to known attacks or
misuses of systems.” (Bace, 2000) Most anti-virus software uses a database of these
signatures to detect malicious activity, and they require frequent updates since new
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malware is created daily. If the exact signature does not exist in the database, then the
IDS will not detect the malware.
There are “some intrusion experts [who] believe that most novel attacks are
variants of known attacks and the “signature” of known attacks can be sufficient to catch
novel variants.” (Khan, Awad, & Thuraisingham, 2007) Though it is true that “script
kiddies” create much of new malware by slightly altering old code in a vain attempt to
avoid anti-virus software, real hackers are smart enough to alter their signatures
significantly enough so that the only chance to defend against a zero-day attack will be
through anomaly detection. Also, polymorphic code has progressed to a point that the
required signature libraries to detect all known attacks have become too large to be useful
on a system with limited memory.
2.1.4

Anomaly-Based

“In pursuit of a secure system, different measures of system behavior have been
proposed, on the basis of an ad hoc presumption that normalcy and anomaly
(illegitimacy) will be accurately manifested in the chosen set of system features.” (Khan,
Awad, & Thuraisingham, 2007) The objective of an anomaly-based IDS “is to define the
normal behavior and consequently anomaly in the behavior of the system.” (Kabiri &
Ghorbani, 2005) This has typically been accomplished by attempting to build patterns of
user activity, network traffic, or system parameters. The patterns are generally of normal
activity, so any anomalies will be represented as intrusions, while patterns of abnormal
conditions generally fall under the purview of signature-based detection.
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The first to suggest an anomaly-based IDS was Dorothy Denning in An Intrusion
Detection Model (1986) when she suggested several statistical methods for detecting
anomalies in user behavior by monitoring a system’s audit records, shown in Table 5.
This “model is independent of any particular system, application environment, system
vulnerability, or type of intrusion, thereby providing a framework for a general-purpose
intrusion detection expert system.” (Denning, 1986) The model did not go into specific
applications, but merely suggested methods for implementation of future work.
Model

Abnormality Indicators

Operational

•

Mean and
Standard
Deviation

•

Multivariate

•

Markov
Process
Time Series

•

•

•

New observation of random variable x exceeds fixed limits based
on empirical data
New observation of random variable x n+1 exceeds confidence
interval that is d standard deviations away from mean of x 1 ,…, x n
No prior knowledge is needed to establish normality and users
[hosts] can have different means depending on usage behaviors
Similar to Mean and Standard Deviation except that it is based on
correlations among two or more metrics
New observation is abnormal if its probability as determined by
the previous state and the transition matrix is too low
New observation is abnormal if its probability as determined by
order and inter-arrival time is too low

Table 5 – Anomaly-Based IDS Models (Denning, 1986)

“Statistical analysis finds deviations from normal patterns of behavior. This
feature, common in research settings, is found in few commercial intrusion detection
products.” (Bace, 2000) This is probably because, “it is indeed very difficult to fix the
threshold of alarm on a statistical variable. Too low, and the false alarm rate increases to
unacceptable levels. Too high, and there is a risk of missing an alarm.” (Debar, Becker,
& Siboni, 1992) Also, “it is required to monitor the system within an intrusion free
working environment for a while. … [and] … Since the user is a human being and
21

humans can be unpredictable, normal behavior modeling of the user can be a very
difficult task.” (Kabiri & Ghorbani, 2005) In fact, the inability to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate activity is a significant argument against anomaly detection.
However, one of the first attempts at user behavior profiling, Next-Generation
Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) (Anderson, Frivold, & Valdes, 1995) was
very successful, and many different useful approaches to statistical analysis have been
put forward since then. “Statistical learning theory (SLT) provides a framework for the
design of algorithms for classification, prediction, feature selection, clustering, sequential
decision-making, novelty detection, trend analysis, and diagnosis. Its techniques are
already being used in bioinformatics, information retrieval, spam filtering and intrusion
detection.” (Fox, Kiciman, & Patterson, 2004)

It has been proposed that anomaly

analysis is the only way to detect heretofore unknown attacks, and may allow detection of
more complex attacks, such as those that occur over extended periods. (Bace, 2000)
Of course, anomaly-based IDSs can be prone to false alarms due to the difficulty
of distinguishing between illegal and merely erroneous behavior, and an inability to deal
well with changes in user activities. “Not every anomaly indicates an intrusion. This is
especially true…where the system is very dynamic. … As a direct result of this
uncertainty, anomaly based IDS will produce high [false positive] alarms.” (Kabiri &
Ghorbani, 2005) Some say it is also “relatively easy for an adversary to trick the detector
into accepting attack activity as normal by gradually varying behavior over time.” (Bace,
2000) This assumes that an attacker can determine what the IDS uses as an indicator and
alter the attack to stay “under the radar.” This research will propose that by monitoring
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operating system process behavior and altering the key features to be monitored in nearreal-time, the IDS can avoid spoofing or reverse engineering of this kind.
2.1.5

Specification-Based

A specification-based IDS attempts to merge the high detection rate of signature
based detection with the ability to detect novel attacks of anomaly based detection.
(Sekar, et al., 2002) The method basically consists of succinctly identifying the machine
state then detecting undesired transitions either caused by a specific signature or
anomalous condition. Hassan, Mahmoud, and El-Kassas successfully applied this
technique to MANETs (2006) while Hussein and Zulkernine (2007) built the IDS into
software with UML to protect individual components. This is still a relatively new area
of study, so it may not offer an improvement over either of the other methods combined.
In fact, (Kabiri & Ghorbani, 2005) report that, “Specification-based approach is only
good when system specifications and details are known and applying limitations on the
user is acceptable.”
2.2

Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
“A mobile ad-hoc network [MANET] is formed by a group of mobile wireless

nodes often without the assistance of fixed or existing network infrastructure…MANETs
[are] much more vulnerable than wired (traditional) networking due to its limited
physical security, volatile network topologies, power-constrained operations, intrinsic
requirement of mutual trust among all nodes in underlying protocol design and lack of
centralized monitoring and management point.” (Huang, et al., 2003)
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Intrusion detection in a MANET or other wireless network is exceedingly difficult
due to changing topology (communication paths) and limitations on computing power. A
network-based IDS must be flexible and robust, able to reconfigure itself depending on
the nodes available and capable of incorporating information from multiple systems. A
host-based IDS must be lightweight and able to work in near-real-time since memory and
processing space are at a premium. PAIDS was designed with these limitations in mind,
so every effort was made to reduce the dimensions of the collected feature set data to
accommodate low memory and processing power.
2.3

Dimension Reduction
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) deal with a “huge amount of data which

contains irrelevant and redundant features causing slow training and testing process,
higher resource consumption as well as poor detection rate.” (Chen, et al., 2007) Thus, it
is important to decrease the amount of data to be analyzed as much as possible, without
losing the information needed to classify an intrusion. “Violating either of these
constraints would either cause the IDS to run too slowly to detect intrusions in real-time,
or would cause the network being protected to run at an unacceptably degraded level of
performance.” (Merkle, et al., 2002) Clearly, “feature selection/construction is the most
challenging problem in building [an] IDS, regardless the development approach in use.”
(Lee, et al., 2000) Various multivariate statistical techniques have been proposed to solve
this problem.
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2.3.1

Principal Component Analysis

One method of simplifying the analysis is Principal Component Analysis (PCA),
which identifies a few uncorrelated linear combinations of a select number of features
from the full data set to explain the majority of variation. To calculate these components,
the normalized eigenvectors of either the covariance or correlation matrix are used to
rotate the original data until they are arranged along an axis of greatest variation.
Generally, when the variables are measured in different units, the data are standardized
and the correlation matrix is used to avoid problems of scale.
In Multivariate Analysis Methods and Applications, (1984, pp. 9-15) Dillon and
Goldstein show how, given an n x p matrix X of n observations with p variables, the
component scores are produced for the correlation matrix through the following steps.
First, the centroid, μ′ , of each variable is calculated where 1′ is a 1 x n unit row vector.
𝟏𝟏

𝛍𝛍′ = 𝐧𝐧 𝟏𝟏′𝐗𝐗

(II-1)

𝐗𝐗 𝐝𝐝 = 𝐗𝐗 − 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏′

(II-2)

Then, the n x p matrix, X d , centered (mean corrected) matrix can be obtained,

and the sample variance of each column of centered data can be calculated.
𝟏𝟏

,
𝐬𝐬𝟐𝟐 = 𝐧𝐧−𝟏𝟏 𝐱𝐱222222
𝐱𝐱 𝐝𝐝
𝐝𝐝 22

(II-3)

Next, the variances are placed in a diagonal matrix, D, and standardized data is computed
𝐗𝐗 𝐬𝐬 = 𝐗𝐗 𝐝𝐝 𝐃𝐃−𝟏𝟏/𝟐𝟐

(II-4)

Finally, the n x p matrix of component scores can be calculated by post multiplying the
standardized data with a p x p matrix 𝛄𝛄 of normalized eigenvectors from the original data
𝐘𝐘 = 𝐗𝐗 𝐬𝐬 𝛄𝛄
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(II-5)

These scores can then replace the original data, and in our case, be used to
discriminate between normal and abnormal conditions. As mentioned previously, the
data to be analyzed by an IDS can be extensive, so only a reduced number of features, or
“principal” components, are kept based on a dimensionality assessment as described in
section 2.3.3.
2.3.2

Factor Analysis

Factor analysis (FA) is similar to PCA, but concentrates on identifying
commonalities between features to determine the essential dimensionality. It is generally
used to assess “underlying relationships or dimensions in the data, and the replacement of
original variables with fewer, new variables.” (Wu & Zhang, 2006) FA can either be
exploratory – to uncover hidden relationships, or confirmatory – to verify suspected
relationships. This research will use exploratory FA to find characteristics which are
most representative of a computer’s reaction to an intrusion.
Dillon and Goldstein (1984, pp. 55-62) state, “while principal components
analysis is best suited for deriving a small set of linear combinations of the original
variables that accounts for most of the total variance, common factor-analytic techniques
can better serve the functions of searching the data for qualitative and quantitative
distinctions.” Their basic structure for exploratory FA is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 – Exploratory Factor Analysis diagram

Expressed as
where X
f
ε
Λ

𝐗𝐗 = 𝚲𝚲𝚲𝚲 + 𝛆𝛆

(II-6)

p-dimensional vector of observed responses
q-dimensional vector of unobservable common factors
p-dimensional vector of unobservable unique factors
p x q matrix of unknown constants called factor loadings

There are p unique factors and it is generally assumed that the unique parts 𝚿𝚿 of

each variable are uncorrelated with each other or with their common parts 𝚽𝚽; that is

And

Ψ1
0
E(𝛆𝛆𝛆𝛆′ ) = Cov(𝛆𝛆) = 𝚿𝚿 = ⎛
⋮
⎝0

0
Ψ2

Cov(𝛜𝛜, 𝐟𝐟′) = 𝟎𝟎

…

0

⎞
0
Ψp ⎠

⋱
0

(II-7)

(II-8)

Which implies the covariance matrix of the response vector X, can be expressed as
Cov(𝐗𝐗) = Σxx = 𝚲𝚲𝚲𝚲𝚲𝚲2′ + 𝚿𝚿

(II-9)

where the covariances (correlations) between the common factors are scaled to be
1
ϕ21
Cov(𝐟𝐟) = 𝚽𝚽 = ⎛
⋮
⎝ϕq1
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1

…

⋱

ϕq,q−1

⎞

1⎠

(II-10)

If the factors are uncorrelated, then Φ = Ι and (2-3) becomes
Σxx = 𝚲𝚲𝚲𝚲2′ + 𝚿𝚿

(II-11)

Dillon and Goldstein (1984, p. 62) continue by stating,
The total number of parameters in need of estimation is
the number of factor loadings, namely pq. There are
𝟏𝟏
p(p + 1) separate variances and covariances in Σ xx . ...
𝟐𝟐
Generally, the requirement for identification is that the
number of parameters be less than the number of equations,
𝟏𝟏
𝟏𝟏
so that 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝 < 𝟐𝟐 p(p + 1) or 𝑞𝑞 < 𝟐𝟐 (p − 1). Thus, q
should be fairly small compared to p. Unfortunately, this
does not guarantee that a solution will exist.
It is important to note that in the case of exploratory
factor analysis, if q > 1 and a solution exists, it is not
generally unique. Using (II-11) we see that any orthogonal
rotation of the factors in the relevant q-space will give a
new set of factors which will also satisfy the conditions of
equation (II-11).
This is important because no matter how we rotate the factor loadings to attempt
discrimination, they still describe the same key variables to be monitored with the IDS.
2.3.3

Dimensionality Assessment

“The size of the feature space is obviously very large. Once the dimensions of the
feature space are multiplied by the number of samples in the feature space, the result will
surely present a very large number. This is why some researchers either select a small
sampling time window or reduce the dimensionality of the feature space.” (Kabiri &
Ghorbani, 2005) The object of both PCA and FA is to reduce the dimensionality of the
scores as far as possible while retaining a majority of variation from the original data.
There are numerous heuristics to accomplish this; one of the most widely used is
Kaiser’s Criterion in which all components associated with eigenvalues less than one are
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discarded. This ensures that each retained component will have a variance greater than
any single variable. Another method, commonly associated with FA, is to add factors
until the average commonality is higher than a certain percentage. This research actually
uses a new heuristic, keeping only those variables that load highly on the first principal
component, then using eigenvectors that contain 80% of the variance to discriminate.
There are also various graphical methods to eliminate components, such as the
maximum secant distance proposed by Robert Johnson (2008) or Cattell’s scree test,
which is named after the rubble that falls to the bottom of a cliff. In the scree test,
eigenvalues are plotted and all components or factors which fall below the “scree line”
are disregarded. For instance, in Figure 5, the first two or three components would be
retained, and the remaining components would be dropped.
The dividing line between the retained and dropped components is not always
obvious, and often more components are kept than are necessary. Johnson proposed an
automatic determination of the “break point” by using the maximum Euclidean distance
of the plotted eigenvalues from the log scale secant line, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 5 – Cattell's Scree Test
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Figure 6 – Max Euclidean Distance of Eigenvalue Curve from Secant Line on Log Scale
(Johnson, 2008)

Whatever heuristic is used, the dimensions of the original data needed to
discriminate are reduced from p components to a smaller number k such that there is
“almost as much information in the k components as there is in the original p variables.”
(Chen, et al., 2007) It is proposed that a lightweight IDS can be created that only
analyzes the reduced data set, but still provides sufficient discrimination between normal
operations and an intrusion.
2.4

Anomaly Classification
2.4.1

Discriminant Analysis

Discriminant analysis (DA) uses linear or non-linear functions to calculate a
Mahalanobis distance between multiple groups, thereby creating boundaries in a
multivariate space. In two dimensions, “Mahalanobis distances are calculated in units of
standard deviation from the group mean. Therefore, the calculated circumscribing ellipse
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formed around the training data actually defines the one standard deviation boundary of
that group.” (Wu & Zhang, 2006)
This technique has been used by Wong and Lai, however they “use DA to identify
the important features from the training dataset and then to validate the obtained feature
set with [support vector machine] (SVM).” (2006) So, instead of using DA to classify
their data once important features have been identified, they use it to choose the salient
features from the original variables. They also mention that “DA is rarely applied to
anomaly-based network intrusion detection,” (Wong & Lai, 2006) but this could be
attributed to a cross-discipline misunderstanding of the most appropriate employment of
this technique. This research asserts that PCA and FA are more effective methods of
determining feature sets, while DA is more efficient at identifying “self” and “non-self.”
Wu and Zhang also use FA to classify different types of attacks into clusters.
This “clustering scheme which classifies attacks based on their factor scores’
‘abnormality’” (Wu & Zhang, 2006) assumes that a particular type of attack will score
highly on the same factors. The same scheme is used to some extent in this research;
however, PCA is used to highlight features, and a form of quadratic discrimination is
used to discriminate between normal and abnormal states.
2.4.2

Quadratic Discrimination and Mahalanobis Distance

Wu and Zhang (2006) used FA with quadratic discrimination to find anomalies by
measuring the Mahalanobis distance of outliers from normal operating levels. “Generally
a test sample is considered as an anomaly if it has abnormal values on one or multiple
factors.” A sample population with both abnormal and normal data is needed to train the
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classifier. Each sample point is compared to the mean of the populations transformed by
the inverse of either the pooled or individual covariance matrices of the samples.
Quadratic discrimination scores are calculated by
1
1
Q
�0 − �
�0 − �
d� i = − 2 ln|Si | − 2 �X
Xi �′Si−1 �X
Xi � + lnPi

(II-12)

Prior probabilities P i of each population are beneficial but not necessary, and if used, the
pooled covariance matrix S p is calculated by
Sp = N

1

1 +N 2 −2

(𝐗𝐗 d1 ′𝐗𝐗 d1 + 𝐗𝐗 d2 ′𝐗𝐗 d2 )

(II-13)

Where X d is the sample data centered about its mean as calculated in Equation (II-2).
The calculated score is then used to classify each data point based on which
population (normal or abnormal) receives the highest score. Quadratic discrimination
allows for nonlinear functions and can get quite complicated in higher dimensions.
However, the concept is quite direct; a linear combination of the original data or
representative functions is used to find the most likely population to which a given
sample belongs. The simple two-dimensional example of the probability of belonging to
one of two populations in Figure 7 shows how this is accomplished.

Figure 7 – Example Mahalanobis Distance
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The difference between the populations on the original X axis is very small;
however, when the data is transformed onto a Y axis of linear combinations of the
original data, there is a marked distinction. In this case, it is possible to classify the two
populations with a straight line along the midpoint of the two centroids, which is Fisher’s
two-group discrimination. Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) developed by Sir Ronald
A. Fisher, in The Use of Multiple Measurements in Taxonomic Problems (1936) finds a
“linear function of … measurements [to] maximize the ratio of the difference between the
specific means to the standard deviation within (groups).” LDA is accomplished using
the squared distance between the means of discriminate scores and the pooled covariance
of the two populations to maximize the distance d between them.

This quantity is maximized when

𝑑𝑑 =

� 𝟏𝟏 −𝐛𝐛′ 𝐗𝐗
� 𝟐𝟐 �
�𝐛𝐛′ 𝐗𝐗
𝐛𝐛 ′ S𝐛𝐛

𝟐𝟐

�2 )
�1 − 𝐗𝐗
𝐛𝐛 = S −1 (𝐗𝐗

(II-14)

(II-15)

Then b is used to transform the original data such that
�i = b′ 𝐗𝐗
�i
𝐘𝐘

(II-16)

This results in a generalized Mahalanobis Distance (MD) (Mahalanobis, 1936) that takes
into account the correlation between two populations
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(II-17)
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“Basically, MD is a measure of distance between two points in the space defined
by two or more correlated variables.” (Wong & Lai, 2006) MD makes the assumption
that the data are nearly normally distributed and have the same covariance matrix, S.
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Like most regression, this technique generally requires more observations than there are
variables to ensure full rank in the matrix. If these conditions do not exist, the data can
be manipulated, adding noise for instance, to generate a more “well behaved” dataset.
This research will use MD between Principal Component scores calculated from a
reduced set of system process data to distinguish between normal and abnormal activity.
The distance is used to group new data into the “closest” population, and the
standard measurement of effectiveness is a “confusion matrix” built from known data.
This matrix records whether data points are classified correctly by the discriminator, and
can be used to calculate an apparent error rate (APER) which is slightly lower than the
actual error rate (AER). For two-way discrimination, this looks like Figure 8.
Predicted Membership

Actual

π1

π1
N 1C

Membership

π2

N 2I

π2
N 1I

n1

N 2C

n2

Figure 8 - Confusion Matrix

where n i
N iC
N iI

total number of data points in population i
number of data points correctly classified in population i
number of data points incorrectly classified in population i

and APER is calculated with

2.4.3

APER =

(N 1I +N 2I )

Support Vector Machines

n 1 +n 2

(II-19)

“The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is one of the most successful classification
algorithms in the data mining area, but its long training time limits its use.” (Khan,
Awad, & Thuraisingham, 2007) (emphasis in the original) “The basic idea in SVM is to
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transform the training data into a higher dimensional space and find the optimal
hyperplane in the space that maximizes the margin between classes.” (Wong & Lai,
2006) The simplest SVM model uses the maximal distance between margins as a kernel
function, which makes it very similar to quadratic discrimination; however, any
appropriate distance function can be utilized. For instance, Wong and Lai (2006) used a
Gaussian radial basis function as the kernel
2

𝑑𝑑 = e−γ‖𝐗𝐗�1 −𝐗𝐗�2 ‖

(II-20)

Where the optimal value for parameter γ was determined with empirical test data.
Khan, Awad, and Thuraisingham attempted to improve on standard SVM by
clustering large data sets. The idea is as follows: SVM computes the maximal margin
separating data points; hence, only those patterns closest to the margin can affect the
computations of that margin, while other points can be discarded without affecting the
result. Those points lying close to the margin are called support vectors, which are then
used to improve the classification limits. By using only the clusters of data points closest
to the margins, the calculations needed for SVM can be dramatically reduced, thus
decreasing required training time. A graphical example of this is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 – Support Vector Machine Classifier (Khan, Awad, & Thuraisingham, 2007)

2.4.4

Decision Trees

Decision trees are another well-known procedure for classification. Chen, et al.
used a C4.5 decision tree algorithm as a classifier between normal and abnormal
conditions, “The algorithm uses a splitting criterion based on the Information Gain Ratio.
The idea is to partition the training set in such a way that the information needed to
classify a given example is reduced as much as possible.” (2007) A decision (or
classification) tree works as follows:
Each internal node in the tree is labeled with a relational
expression that compares a numeric attribute/feature of the
object being classified to a constant splitting value. Each leaf
is labeled to indicate whether it represents a positive or
negative instance of the class of interest (e.g., failed
execution). An object is classified by traversing the tree from
the root to a leaf. At each step of the traversal prior to
reaching a leaf, the expression at the current node is evaluated
… A classification tree is constructed algorithmically using a
training set containing positive and negative instances of the
class of interest. (Francis, et al., 2004)
Although decision trees can be efficient, they are most useful for clustering
attacks into distinct types (denial of service, probes, buffer overflows, etc.) to elicit an
appropriate response. Also, they can be computationally demanding if partitions are not
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effectively established. Since this research is only concerned with proving the concept of
identifying an intrusion using process data and not on identifying the type of attack, the
computationally simple and efficient Mahalanobis distance between populations will be
employed to classify intrusions instead.
2.4.5

Genetic Algorithms

A genetic algorithm (GA) has been used to improve SVM so that it “is not only
able to select [an] ‘optimal feature set’ but also is able to figure out ‘optimal parameters’
for [the] SVM classifier.” (Kim, Nguyen, & Park, 2005) GA builds a database of rules or
signatures based on their fitness in classifying training data, which is subsequently used
by the IDS. “A GA is essentially a type of search algorithm which is used to solve a wide
variety of problems. The goal of a GA is to create optimal solutions to problems.
Potential solutions are encoded as a sequence of bits, characters or numbers. This unit of
encoding is called a gene, and the encoding sequence is known as a chromosome. The
GA begins with a set of these chromosomes and an evaluation function that measures the
fitness of each chromosome. It uses reproduction, such as crossover and mutation to
create new solutions, which are then evaluated.” (Pillai, Eloff, & Venter, 2004) Although
GA is effective, it is computationally expensive, and is not feasible for a lightweight IDS.
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Figure 10 – Basic Iteration of a Genetic Algorithm (Pillai, et al., 2004)

2.4.6

Neural Networks

Another computationally expensive method for classification is a neural network.
A neural network transforms an input vector into a weighted output vector through the
use of hidden interconnected nodes. For an IDS, the input vector would be a particular
feature set, and the output vector would be a classification of “normal” or “abnormal”.
As usual, there are advantages and disadvantages to this system. On the plus side, “Data
in the audit trail may be incomplete, a field is sometimes missing, or the accuracy of the
measure is low. ... An intruder may try to alter the audit records to hide its illegal activity.
However, the neural network will be able to cope with this kind of problem.” (Debar,
Becker, & Siboni, 1992) On the other hand, Balducelli, et al. warn, a “neural encoder
needs to be trained (for many hours) with data collected during more days and weeks.”
(2007) This is not practical for a system with low processing power. “Also, since
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recurrent neural networks are retroactive systems, unstable configurations appear,”
(Debar, Becker, & Siboni, 1992) and, it does not allow for updates in real-time.

Figure 11 – Neural Network (Balducelli, et al.)

2.4.7

Immune System Algorithms

A different approach to anomaly detection through identification of “self” is to
simulate an immune system by generating a string of detectors that do not match any of
the protected data, then “monitor the protected data by comparing them with the
detectors. If a detector is ever activated, a change is known to have occurred.” (Forrest,
et al., 1994) While this may be useful in protecting static data, it is not applicable to
detecting intrusion in a highly variable environment, or in detecting attacks that simply
steal or redirect data without altering it.
Another approach to using the immune system as a model is “based essentially on
mathematical models extracted as an abstract of general principles of information
processing by natural immune systems.” (Tarakanov, 2008) This method uses training
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data to map “antibodies” (rules or signatures) that are then used to classify other
“molecules” as shown in Figure 12. In this case, normal conditions can be recognized,
and anything other than that is classified as abnormal.

Figure 12 – Artificial Immune Intrusion Detection System (Tarakanov, 2008)

2.5

Data Generation
2.5.1

Repeatable, Sanitized, and Realistic

Data generation is a major problem in IDS development, specifically “the need
for a properly labeled set of normal training data from which to construct standard
statistical measures or train advanced systems. Statistical analysis requires such a set to
ascertain what constitutes normal activity and classification based systems that can be
trained require the set for their training.” (Brugger, et al., 2001) Some problems may
arise when training and testing an anomaly detection IDS due to the difficulty in ensuring
repeatable, sanitized, realistic traffic. (Mell, et al., 2003)

40

The importance of repeatable data is a basic tenet of scientific experimentation,
however the other two characteristics warrant some explanation. Sanitization ensures
there are no unknown viruses in the data to be analyzed since a “problem with real
background data is that it may contain attacks about which we know nothing,” (Mell, et
al., 2003) which can cause problems in assessing “false” detections. Realistic data is
important to ensure the IDS is not simply successful for a unique, simplified situation, but
is universally applicable. “This problem hasn't been well addressed by the existing
literature. The accepted practice seems to be to have a few weeks of training data that is
thoroughly analyzed and labeled by a human analyst. Many of the research projects to
date have used the data provided as part of the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection system
shootout …While such data sets are essential for comparing different IDS, they are
highly labor intensive to produce and may not be totally accurate.” (Brugger, et al., 2001)
Another common frame of reference is the KDD 1999 Cup data (Chen, et al., 2007)
(Kabiri & Ghorbani, 2005) (Kim, Nguyen, & Park, 2005) (Wong & Lai, 2006) but these
datasets, though they have faults and benefits, only provide TCP dumps and other
characteristics of network traffic with no information about the hosts under attack, so
they are not usable for this research.
“Many evaluations test IDSs using no background traffic as a reference condition.
In such experiments, an IDS is set up on a host or network on which there is no activity.
Then, computer attacks are launched on this host or network to determine whether or not
the IDS can detect the attacks. This technique can determine an IDS hit rate but can say
nothing about false positives.” (Mell, et al., 2003) This is the approach used for this
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research, using a crossover cable connector between two laptops to simulate an Internet
connection. In this way, the attack can be controllable and repeatable, even if realism is
somewhat sacrificed.
2.5.2

Trustworthiness

Another major problem with the implementation of any security measure is the
uncertain “guarantee that the data to be protected are uncorrupted at the time that the
detectors are generated.” (Forrest, et al., 1994) Like sanitized test data, it is vital that
users trust their system is uninfected before they apply an IDS. This research used standalone computers on a closed network to run experiments and data analysis to avoid the
possibility of inadvertent contamination. However, some of the software used was
downloaded from open Internet sources, so it is possible additional unwanted code was
included. To mitigate this threat, older, more benign versions were collected from an
established source to limit potential exposure.
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III.
3.1

Methodology

Problem Definition
3.1.1

Assumptions and Hypotheses

Most intrusion detection systems attempt to stop attacks before they happen by
parsing network traffic data and applying code signatures or behavioral rule sets to catch
malware in the delivery process. However, if an attack has an unknown pattern it is
likely to bypass most of the existing IDS software. Thus, if one is to detect new or
polymorphic malware, one must be able to distinguish between normal and abnormal
activity on the attacked system rather than rely on signature matching.
Many solutions to this problem have been proposed, which have been discussed
in the previous section, but none of them rely exclusively on operating system parameters
to discriminate between normal and abnormal. It is possible this is because many modern
attacks alter the operating system itself, or because once an operating system shows signs
of an attack the damage may already be done. It is the premise of this research that any
attack will have a measurable effect on the operating system in at least one of the
proposed 18 dimensions, despite attempts by a hacker to deceive the victim, and that
notification of an attack in progress is better than none at all.
Process Anomaly IDS (PAIDS) is intended as a last chance discovery of malware
at the host level that has managed to avoid detection by a robust multi-layered security
system. PAIDS detects backdoor intrusion based solely on operating system performance
and can adapt to changing conditions. This is a valuable tool since backdoors are
notoriously difficult to detect once they are resident and active on computer systems.
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3.1.2

Properties of PAIDS

“Computer networks have a dynamic nature in a sense that information and data
within them are continuously changing. Therefore, detecting an intrusion accurately and
promptly, the system has to operate in real time…not just to perform the detection in real
time, but to adapt to the new dynamics in the network.” (Kabiri & Ghorbani, 2005)
Establishing a “normal” baseline at startup is not sufficient to detect intrusions, because
once legitimate activity occurs on the system, the “normal” conditions change. This
poses problems for an anomaly detection system, because identifying rare legitimate
activity as abnormal can lead to false positives, and incorporating illegitimate activity
into a normal model can lead to false negatives.
For instance, in behavioral pattern matching, if a user only accesses a program
once a month, this activity may be considered abnormal and identified as an intrusion by
an IDS. Difficulty incorporating anomalous legitimate behavior into a “normal” baseline
model has always been the bane of anomaly detection systems. Another problem with
anomaly detection is a hacker can make his/her intrusion appear normal by testing the
limits of the IDS and attacking at the “boundary” layer to either push the “normal”
baseline past a vulnerable point, or determine the applicable feature set and avoid it.
PAIDS avoids the first problem by periodically analyzing data samples, and
reestablishing a baseline of normality based on existing conditions of legitimate activity.
Also, since it uses a linear combination of 18 different characteristics of the operating
processes, it is less vulnerable to false positives generated by rare legitimate activity. To
combat the second problem, the use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) helps
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PAIDS avoid deception and reverse engineering by hackers, because classification
happens in an abstract “feature space” indiscernible to an outside observer. Finally,
PAIDS alters the key variables it uses based on the factor loading scores from PCA each
time it resets the baseline, so it is nearly impossible to determine the “boundary” used for
classification. This also helps PAIDS learn what is normal and which processes are most
important at the time to discriminate between normal and abnormal activity, so the
algorithm evolves with changing conditions.
3.2

Tools
3.2.1

MATLAB®

A powerful piece of numerical processing software developed by The Mathworks
Inc., MATLAB has been the “language of technical computing” for decades. It was
designed to perform analytical operations on large matrices and it is capable of compiling
user defined programs as well as offering a wide array of pre-defined functions. This
research used version 7.6.0.324 (R2008a) for pre-processing data on the laptop, and for
some of the post-processing as well. Most of the post-processing was performed using
version 7.4.0.287 (R2007a) on the AFIT LAN. Programs written in MATLAB code for
this research can be easily compiled into other languages to improve performance in an
actual IDS.
3.2.2

TaskInfo

TaskInfo is shareware developed by Igor M. Arsenin to “combine and improve
features of Task Manager and System Information tools. It visually monitors (in text and
graphical forms) different types of system information in any Windows system in real

45

time.” (Arsenin, 2008) This research used version 7.2.0, though a more recent version
was released on 10 Nov 08. Some of its professed capabilities are:


List of all running processes and threads (including system threads), with
detailed information about each process: CPU and memory usage, path, all
opened files and modules (DLLs), command line, environment variables, opened
connections and more
 List most of the processes that want to be invisible like worms, keyloggers and
other spy software
 Total CPU(s), memory (physical, virtual, cache and swap) usage
 Detailed information about installed CPU(s) and operating system
 Data rates on local disks, network server/client, Dial-Up I/O
 All opened files, drivers and TCP/IP, VPN connections with details
(Arsenin, 2008)
The first capability, detailed process information, was the most useful to this research,
since the primary purpose of using TaskInfo was to record as much raw data on running
processes as possible. An example of the visual output from TaskInfo can be found in
Appendix C – TaskInfo Screenshot. If it had simply been a GUI, the data would be
worthless for processing, but fortunately TaskInfo also allows you to:






Copy all information to clipboard or text file
Run/stop processes and shutdown/restart the system
Use it from command line
Automatically show different low-resource alerts
"Free" physical memory on demand (Arsenin, 2008)

The first capability, copying information to a text file, provided a useable output and the
third capability, command line use, enabled convenient access to TaskInfo through a
batch file designed for data collection. An example of the output file, converted to an
Excel format, appears in Appendix A – Output Data from TaskInfo in Excel Format.
3.2.3

Sub7

Also known as SubSeven, this is one of the best known, most widely distributed
backdoor programs on the Internet. “It is mainly used for causing mischief, such as
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hiding the computer cursor, changing system settings or loading up pornographic
websites. However, it can also be used for more serious criminal applications, such as
stealing credit card details [or passwords] with a keystroke logger.” (Wikipedia, 2008)
Other nefarious features include the ability to upload or download files, alter system data,
or completely destroy the hard drive of the infected computer.
A backdoor allows an unauthorized user entry to a system by circumventing
legitimate access controls. Generally, a backdoor must either be installed prior to initial
use of the system, or a legitimate user must be tricked into installing it through the use of
a Trojan. A Trojan is a malware executable disguised as something the user may be
interested in or curious about, and is the classic method of socially engineering the spread
of viruses, worms, backdoors and other malware. The Sub7 Trojan establishes a server
on the victim computer that subsequently notifies the intruder when and where it has been
activated through the use of ICQ, email, or other instant messaging service. The hacker
then uses a client program to contact the server, thus providing unauthorized access to the
victim computer.
Sub7 has been around since the mid-1990s, so most anti-virus software can now
detect its existence, though new variations are always being developed and deployed. It
is very user friendly, with a straight forward GUI for a multitude of malicious activities,
shown in Appendix B – SubSeven Command Screens. This research used version 1.5,
developed in 1999 by a hacker named mobman, which was downloaded from
www.hackpr.net/~sub7/downloads.shtml, a mirror for www.sub7.net. While there is no
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guarantee that the code was pristine since it came from the “wild”, it is a very old version
and less likely to contain other hidden code since it was archived for historical purposes.
3.3

Experimental Design
3.3.1

Factors

To design an experiment properly, the factors to be studied must be identified.
Obviously, the goal of developing an IDS is to identify an intrusion, so the primary
variable is whether the system has malware functioning on it or not. To distinguish the
effects of malware from the effects of legitimate activity, one must compare these factors
and their interactions, so the next variable is the level of legitimate activity on the system
at any given time. For this research, three levels of activity were used:
•

low – no programs active except those needed to collect data

•

medium – one or two programs running (i.e. Word and PowerPoint)

•

high – multiple programs running requiring large amounts of memory
(i.e. Word, PowerPoint, Excel, MATLAB)

An additional factor of active or inactive connection to the Internet was
considered; however, for security purposes, this option was not implemented. Also, to
ensure statistically significant results were obtained, multiple replications of the
experiment at each factor level were required.
3.3.2

Test Runs

Four formal tests were run to collect data in order to develop and test the
algorithms used in PAIDS. The first experimental runs simply recorded data under three
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conditions to determine if discrimination was even possible: low activity without
malware present, medium activity without malware present, and low activity with
malware present. These data sets were collected with no consideration of log-on session
or warm-up times. Length of collection varied from 500 seconds to 2000 seconds, and
samples were at two second intervals due to limitations in code speed.
Once the concept was proven, DesignExpert® Version 7.1.5 was used to build a
full factorial experiment with five replications at two levels of malware (present or
absent) and three levels of activity (low, medium, high) which produced the test plan
shown in Appendix J – Nov21 Test Plan. This plan was used to ensure all possible
interactions between the factors were studied without inducing unintended interactions
due to the order of runs. These data sets were collected under a single log on session
without resetting either system except to delete the malware from the victim computer
between runs. Each replication was 1000 seconds long with samples taken at one second
intervals.
Additional runs were collected afterwards which considerably simplified the
interactions, with data containing (activity/malware):
•

Run 1 – ½ low / no ; ½ low / yes

•

Run 2 – ½ low / no ; ½ high / no

•

Run 3 – 1�3 low / no ; 1�3 high / no ; 1�3 high / yes

Each of these runs was collected on a separate log-on session by recycling power on the
victim computer with a five minute warm-up period after start-up. These last runs lasted
2000 seconds with a one second sample rate, and were used for the majority of
experimentation.
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3.3.3

Data Collection

The basic methodology remained consistent throughout this experimentation;
output was produced with TaskInfo for a certain period of time without intrusion or
legitimate activity, then malware was introduced into the system, legitimate activity was
started, or both depending on the requirements of the run. Times were recorded
throughout the experiments so the resulting datasets could be divided into periods of
intrusion and levels of legitimate activity.
Data was collected by calling TaskInfo with a simple batch file
cd "c:\Program Files\Iarsn\TaskInfo 8.x\"
TaskInfo pl "c:\Thesis\data\1.txt"
TaskInfo pl "c:\Thesis\data\2.txt"
…
TaskInfo pl "c:\Thesis\data\2000.txt"
Although there is certainly a more elegant way to record data into successively named
and time-stamped output files, this worked well enough for the research. The data was
later read by an import function written specifically for the output file format.
The import data function (Appendix C – Import Data) initially required
MATLAB to be running, which limited data collection to once every two seconds due to
operation of the code. However, this severely affected the quality of the output, because
MATLAB uses a huge amount of memory and data is not collected fast enough. By
using the batch file to call TaskInfo, data could be collected once per second and did not
require MATLAB to be running during data collection. This not only streamlined the
process, but limited the effect of monitoring software on the operating system. Any
actual application of PAIDS will require much more efficient data collection, described
further in Conclusions and Future Research.
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3.4

Implementation
3.4.1

Hardware Environment

One of the difficulties in performing cyberwarfare experimentation is harvesting
malware and analyzing it without adversely affecting your own systems. In this way it is
akin to biological warfare, which requires sequestered clean rooms with stringent
protocols in handling viral and bacteriological weapons. This necessity is summarized
well by the European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research (EICAR), “Using real
viruses for testing in the real world is rather like setting fire to the dustbin in your office
to see whether the smoke detector is working.” (EICAR, 2006) The Laboratory for
Information System Security/Assurance Research and Development (LISSARD) at
AFIT’s Center for Cyberspace Research provides this environment, where researchers
can download and test malware and anti-virus programs alike.
One possibility for testing the effects of malware on systems is to set up virtual
machines using VMware or simulate networks with OpNet, QualNet, ns2, LARIAT, or a
similar platform. This allows the experimenter to employ the same attacks on the same
system repeatedly without danger of affecting a real operating system. However, these
simulators are unable to provide the granularity of host-level responses this research was
interested in, namely operating characteristics such as CPU and memory usage, number
of handles, threads, and windows open, and read/write operations. In order to collect this
type of information, real systems were required.
To further protect the LAN and provide a more sterile environment for
experimentation, this research used standalone laptops. As a proof of concept, this
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research used two laptops which were Intel® Core™ 2 Duo CPU, T7300 @ 2.00GHz
with 1.99GB RAM running Microsoft Windows XP Professional 2002 with Service Pack
2. One laptop was designated the attacker and one the victim, and they were linked
together with a generic category 5E crossover cable to simulate a network connection.
To accomplish this, the IP address of the defender was established as 10.1.1.1 and the
attacker as 10.1.1.2, both on subnet 255.255.255.0. Although this does not allow for
background network traffic, which is a limitation described in Section 2.5.1, the data
collected does not factor in network traffic anyway, so it was considered an acceptable
loss of fidelity.
3.4.2

Software Environment

There are many useful tools to test for computer vulnerabilities and simulate
malware effects. One widely used application is Nessus, which scans a system for
weaknesses in access control, checks for current patch updates, and probes ports with
known attack profiles. Metasploit is a well known framework for developing and
decoding exploitations, and is often used to test IDS software. EICAR has also
developed a simple text file to test anti-virus software, which can be found at
http://eicar.org/anti_virus_test_file.htm, but will not be reproduced here as it causes antivirus software to quarantine any file containing the known character string (including
Word documents). These are valuable because they allow researchers to simulate effects
without actually infecting systems with real malware. Although many of these tools were
investigated, they were ultimately supplanted by actual malware, which was more
applicable to this research.
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The search for appropriate malware that predictably and appreciably affects a
victim system yet is easily removable is a non-trivial task. Though there are numerous
blogs, websites, and businesses dedicated to collecting information about malware and
publishing fixes (Astalavista.com, Milw0rm.com, bleepingcomputer.com, etc.) a
guaranteed location to find reliably unaltered source code for malware online could not
be found. Initially, a popular virus ironically called Antivirus XP 2008 was a prime
candidate since its effects and procedures for removal are widely documented, but it was
not possible to find a dependable copy of the actual virus without a danger of infection by
other malware. After a considerable amount of investigation, older copies of the popular
Sub7 program were discovered, which provided an ideal platform to test intrusion while
limiting the danger of additional attached malware. Fortunately, the service pack (2)
loaded on the laptops was susceptible to Sub7, otherwise they would have had to be
reloaded with an older patch to allow the exploit to work.
To enhance security, hardware restrictions were applied as described previously,
and exposure to hacker sites was kept to a minimum while retrieving the necessary
malware. In addition, full scans were completed with Symantec Antivirus 2005, Version
10.0.2.2000, Scan Engine 71.1.0.11 with Virus Definition File 3/29/2007 rev. 32 after
downloading the malware, as well as between data collection runs, to ensure the laptops
were as pristine as possible.
The anti-virus software did pose some problems, however, as the auto-protect
feature deleted Sub7 files as soon as they were downloaded. Therefore, the auto-protect
feature had to be disabled while the malware was being harvested and while tests were
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being run. Also, Symantec is very interested in protecting users from inadvertent lapses
in security, so the auto-protect feature reengages itself every 30 minutes, which required
constant vigilance during test runs. Since the 1.5 version of Sub7 is an older malware
program, the anti-virus software had no problems finding it. Also, Sub7 allows the user
to design their own server with specific capabilities on what programs it can attach to,
where it “hides” on the victim system, and how it contacts the hacker. The server
developed for this research was intentionally designed to be as transparent as possible
after installation to enable easy removal. However, the ease of detection by existing antivirus software did not necessarily make it easier for PAIDS since PAIDS is looking for
anomalous activity in system processes rather than for a specific code string like
Symantec does.
TaskInfo was practical to collect data for research, but it would be unrealistic to
rely on text output for a true IDS, because the minimum data collection rate is only once
every ½ second which is still far too slow to be effective at detecting attacks which can
happen in milliseconds. Also, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle applies to analyzing
an operating system with a program that is working on the same operating system (i.e.
measurements of the system are affected by the monitoring program.) Instead, the
necessary data should be gathered directly from the operating system and analyzed by an
embedded PAIDS, preferably at the kernel level or lower using primitive hardware
monitors or software not resident on the operating system being monitored.
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3.4.3

Data Acquisition and Formatting

At the start of the project, it was hoped an existing data set could be analyzed to
prove the concept of identifying the operation of malware through system anomalies
rather than the standard method of parsing network traffic. This would allow comparison
to previous IDS performance, and simplify the research since a new data set takes time to
generate. The DARPA 1998 dataset produced by MIT Lincoln Labs was promising, but
did not contain the granularity of host level responses required. Likewise the KDD 1999
Cup data was unusable, as it merely contained packet data from TCP dumps and not
operating system measurements. Thus, like many other IDS research projects, the data
had to be produced locally.
Although the Center for Cyberspace Research did not have specific software to
record system process parameters, it was relatively easy to procure with a quick Internet
search. TaskInfo, a shareware program designed by Igor Arsenin, was an ideal platform
for collecting the desired test data. Unfortunately, the program is primarily a GUI, and
text output from the program (Appendix A – Output Data from TaskInfo in Excel
Format) was not accessible in real time by the preferred analysis software, MATLAB.
Therefore, to generate time sequenced data, test runs were recorded into an output folder
as described in Data Collection, and then transferred into a useable array format as
described below.
TaskInfo actually collects a great deal of information, but many of the fields are
non-numeric. These fields could be used for classification by assigning numeric values
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to the categorical information, but the numerical data already present provided enough
discrimination so they were dropped. The remaining data fields are listed in Table 6.

VARIABLE
PID
% CPU
% K CPU
Sw/s
InMem KB
Private KB
Total KB
Th
Handles
Windows
USER Obj
GDI Obj
Reads
Read KB
Rd Rate B/s
Writes
Write KB
Wr Rate B/s

DESCRIPTION
Process Identification Number
Percentage CPU used by each process
Percentage kernel CPU used by each process
Number of switches to execution of process/second
Physical memory used by process in KB
Virtual memory used by process in KB
Total virtual address space used by process in KB
Number of threads currently running in process
Number of handles opened by process
Number of windows opened by process
Number of user objects opened by process
Number of GDI objects opened by process
Number of read operations issued by process
Data read by process in KB
Read data rate in bytes/sec
Number of write operations issued by process
Data written by process in KB
Write data rate in bytes/sec

Table 6 – Characteristics Collected for each Operating System Process

Converting the output into a numerical array was not a trivial task. Each line of
the text file had to be read and decomposed individually, then converted to a single row
vector representing the various characteristics for every process during each sample. The
resulting vector starts with the first characteristic and lists the corresponding values for
each process, then continues to the next characteristic until all 17 are recorded (Table 9).
Two other idiosyncrasies of computer process operations compelled further data
manipulation. First, the number of processes running at any particular moment changes
as they are started and stopped, either by recurring automatic activities (disk scans,
autosaves, etc.) or by normal legitimate activity. Next, the order processes are put in the
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“stack” is different every time a computer is turned on. Therefore, it was necessary to
develop a method to standardize the number of processes to be recorded, and the data had
to be scrubbed to ensure the same processes were being compared in the same way
between data collection sets. Otherwise, the correlation matrices produced by PCA and
FA would be meaningless.
The first problem actually has a simple solution because each new process gets
assigned a process identification (PID) when it is started. When the PID number gets too
large, the PIDs cycle back to one, so no two concurrently running processes will ever
have the same number. To ensure the same processes are recorded from one sample to
the next, PAIDS compares the PIDs from the first two samples of collected data and
retains only the identical PIDs. These become “static” processes, and the characteristics
in Table 6 are collected for only these processes. The number of processes beyond the
“static” ones is also recorded as an additional characteristic, which is added to the end of
the row vector for that sample. For this research, there were generally 52 or 53 static
processes, and since 18 characteristics are retained for each process, the matrices were
generally at least 1000 x 936. In fact, the sample size of 1000 seconds was chosen to
ensure the matrices were full rank and statistically significant.
A simple example will show how this works. Assume the data in Table 7 is the
first sample taken, while data in Table 8 is the second sample, with only nine
characteristics recorded for each process. If one were to look only at the Process
information, they appear identical, however if the PIDs are compared, it is seen that from
the first sample to the next, the first instances of cmd.exe and TaskInfo.exe have been
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dropped and the next instances have moved up in the stack to replace them. At the same
time, new instances of the same processes have been added.
Process
PID % CPU % K CPU Sw/s InMem KB Private KB Total KB Th Handles
alg.exe
2660
0
3,560
1,200 33,196 6
105
Dot1XCfg.exe 2044
40
14,624
9,716 156,808 15
297
wuauclt.exe
2932
0
4,080
2,220 36,852 3
206
EXCEL.EXE
3116 0.72%
91
39,612
20,368 172,308 10
694
cmd.exe
3584
0
1,204
1,448 13,636 1
19
TaskInfo.exe 2812 2.17%
1.44% 179
10,320
7,224 49,952 5
150
cmd.exe
3668
0
1,328
1,448 13,636 1
19
TaskInfo.exe 2808
0
8,008
5,940 46,808 5
95
Table 7 – Sample 1 Notional Data

Process
PID % CPU % K CPU Sw/s InMem KB Private KB Total KB Th Handles
alg.exe
2660
0
3,560
1,200 33,196 6
105
Dot1XCfg.exe 2044
48
14,624
9,716 156,808 15
297
wuauclt.exe
2932
0
4,080
2,220 36,852 3
206
EXCEL.EXE
3116 0.72%
0.72% 135
39,612
20,368 172,308 10
694
cmd.exe
3668
0
1,328
1,448 13,636 1
19
TaskInfo.exe 2808 2.90%
0.72% 766
10,324
7,224 49,952 5
150
cmd.exe
2332
0
1,260
1,448 13,636 1
19
TaskInfo.exe 2368
0
8,808
6,804 46,808 5
97
Table 8 – Sample 2 Notional Data

It is easy to see that if these two samples had been compared to one another in a
covariance or correlation matrix, or by any standard of measure for that matter, anomalies
would most certainly arise, but they would be meaningless. Thus, for this example, only
the first four processes would be kept for analysis, although the total number of processes
running at each moment would be recorded as an additional characteristic. The data is
then read in order of columns into a row vector for each sample as shown in Table 9.
% CPU

% KCPU

Sw/s

InMemKB

Private KB

Total KB

Threads

Handles

#

0 0 0

0.72 0 0 0 0 0 40 0

91 3560

14624 4080

39612 1200 9716 2220 20368

33196 156808 36852

172308 6 15 3 10 105 297 206 694 8

0 0 0

0.72 0 0 0 0 0 48 0 135 3560

14624 4080

39612 1200 9716 2220 20368

33196 156808 36852

172308 6 15 3 10 105 297 206 694 8

Table 9 – Row Vectors for Sample Notional Data
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This is only a valid procedure assuming the computer has not been infected prior
to start-up. If the computer is already infected, then the malware effects will probably be
incorporated into the initial “normal” baseline and PAIDS will most likely not detect an
anomalous condition caused by the malware in the future. However, this is an
unavoidable weakness in any anomaly detection IDS.
The second problem, process order, is only applicable to historical data collected
for this research. This will not be a problem in the actual PAIDS, because the baseline
dataset will be reset every time a computer is turned, and the order of the “static”
processes will not change during that session. The only time it may be a problem is if a
process is started before PAIDS makes it “static” assessment, and is dropped afterwards.
For instance, in the example Excel.exe is regarded as “static”; however, if the user quits
Excel the same number of processes is still recorded to maintain constant dimensionality,
thus cmd.exe would be recorded as “static” in the second sample. In this case, although
the dimensions of the matrices match, the last process in every subsequent sample will
change, and the analysis will be meaningless.
Even after the data is successfully stored in a numerical array, it requires some
slight modifications to be analyzed using multivariate methods. Specifically, if a column
contains no variation, when the correlation matrix is calculated, these columns produce
infinite values when they are inverted, the matrix becomes singular, and the method fails.
In any other data set, these columns would be dropped as they obviously don’t affect the
outcome since they don’t change and cannot contain any anomalous condition. However,
in this case, columns that have no variation vary between data sets, so if they were
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dropped, comparisons would be made between the wrong characteristics and dimensions
often would not match. For instance, the number of write operations in one dataset might
be compared to the amount of data written in another dataset, which clearly doesn’t make
sense.
Instead of dropping columns with no variance, they are replaced with random
noise. This has little effect on the analysis, since by its nature the noise does not contain
significant anomalies, and the method retains all columns so the dimension of the array
remains constant. One problem encountered with this technique is in the calculation of
zero variance. When MATLAB calculates the standard deviation of a column, a floating
point error often produces values that are extremely small (on the order of e-17) instead of
zero and these columns are not replaced with noise. Thus, the workaround seen on line
27 of Appendix F – PCA/Mahalanobis Distance was developed to get the results desired.
At the same time, all columns are normalized to values between 0 and 1 by
dividing each value by the largest value in the column, so the matrix is not subject to
scale problems caused by measurements on different orders of magnitude (i.e. number of
threads open vs. kilobytes of data read.) When this is complete, the matrix generated is
normalized, numerical, nonsingular, and positive definite. Finally, the data is ready for
multivariate statistical analysis.
3.5

Statistical Methods
3.5.1

Factor Analysis

This research began with the premise that FA would be a better tool to aid in
discrimination between normal and abnormal because the technique finds a linear
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combination of unobservable factors based on commonalities and uniqueness of the data.
Also, factor rotation could be used to find the most effective axis of discrimination.
Thus, this technique seems ideal to find anomalies and distinguish between the
populations. In practice, several difficulties were encountered.
First, the data in this research is not very well behaved. The arrays are sparse, not
well scaled, contain many variables with no variation, and are very large. The problems
and solutions to importation and manipulation have been described in 3.4.3, and most of
them were developed in response to singularity issues encountered when performing FA.
For instance, in order to calculate standardized data for a dataset X, the inverse square
root of the diagonal of the covariance matrix is needed.
S11
⎛S
Cov(𝐗𝐗) = ⎜ 21
⋮
S
⎝ p1
1

1

𝐃𝐃−2

S11 −2
⎛
=⎜ 0
⋮
⎝ 0

S12
S22

…
⋱

0

S22

−12

…
⋱

S1p
Spp

⎞
⎟

(III-1)

⎠

0

1

⎞
⎟

(III-2)

Spp −2 ⎠

However, when the inverse of this matrix is computed with the original data, the columns
with zero variance create infinite values and the matrix becomes singular. Obviously, the
same problem occurs when the correlation matrix is calculated.
Once the singularity problems are fixed with random noise, the number of factors
to be retained must be determined. This is accomplished with the Principal Factor
method. Starting with equation (II-11) we can estimate the correlation matrix R with R*
61

𝐑𝐑 = 𝚲𝚲𝚲𝚲2′ + 𝚿𝚿

(III-3)

𝐑𝐑∗ = 𝐡𝐡𝟐𝟐 + 𝚿𝚿

(III-4)

𝚲𝚲 = √𝛌𝛌𝛄𝛄

(III-5)

Then h2 can be calculated by squaring the factor loading matrix 𝚲𝚲 where

𝛌𝛌 is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues from the original correlation matrix

𝛄𝛄 is the matrix of corresponding eigenvectors arranged in columns

The commonality estimates h i 2 become the diagonal of R*
h12
⎛Γ
𝐑𝐑∗ = ⎜ 21
⋮
Γ
⎝ p1

Γ12
h22

…
⋱

Γ1p
h2p

⎞
⎟

(III-6)

⎠

R* grows by iterating until the estimated average commonality ∑ h2i ⁄p is greater

than a specified value. In this research the value was set at 80%. Once the number of

factors, p, has been established, the eigenvalues, 𝛌𝛌, can be resized to a p x p matrix and
factor scores can be calculated for the remaining data.

Since R* accounts for all of the factors, and h2 accounts for the commonality in
the factors, if R* is normalized then from (III-4)
𝚿𝚿 = 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐡𝐡𝟐𝟐

(III-7)

Factor scores are then calculated using, 𝚿𝚿, the estimate of factor uniqueness.

Various methods have been proposed to calculate this score.
General Least Squares:
Min Mean Square Error:
General Regression:

𝐟𝐟 = (𝚲𝚲′𝚿𝚿−𝟏𝟏 𝚲𝚲)−𝟏𝟏 (𝚲𝚲′𝚿𝚿−𝟏𝟏 )𝐗𝐗 ′𝐝𝐝

(III-8)

𝐟𝐟 = 𝐗𝐗 ′𝐬𝐬 (𝐑𝐑)−𝟏𝟏 𝚲𝚲

(III-10)

𝐟𝐟 = 𝚲𝚲′(𝚲𝚲′ 𝚲𝚲 + 𝚿𝚿)𝐗𝐗 ′𝐝𝐝
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(III-9)

In this research, X d and X s start with the data to be analyzed then adjusts by the
mean of the baseline data as described in section 2.3.1. In this way, the new data is
compared against the existing sense of “normality” before incorporating any changes into
the model. Also, if known changes do occur, for instance when legitimately opening a
program, a new baseline can be established, so anomalies will only occur from unknown
conditions such as an intrusion.
Once a p x 1 factor score, f, has been obtained, Mahalanobis Distance, MD, is
calculated for each of n samples using (II-18) with p x p retained eigenvalues, 𝛌𝛌, instead
of the covariance matrix. Assuming the average factor score for baseline data is zero
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝐟𝐟′𝛌𝛌−1 𝐟𝐟

(III-11)

The MD vector is then used for discrimination between normal and abnormal.
All of the above methods for calculating factor scores were tried in this research,
however, none of them performed as well as Principal Component Analysis. The reasons
for this are described further in Results and Analysis.
3.5.2

Principal Component Analysis

In PCA, a smaller weighted set of linear combinations that describes most of the
variation of the original characteristics is calculated to reduce the dimensionality of the
problem. In this research, PCA was used in two stages of the problem. First, it was used
to select a representative feature set and establish a baseline data set. Next, it was used to
compare this baseline to new collected data and calculate a Mahalanobis Distance (MD)
between Principal Component Scores. The MD is then used to determine normal or
abnormal activity.
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When PCA is performed, a loading matrix, L, is calculated from the product of
eigenvectors, 𝛄𝛄, and the square root of the eigenvalues, 𝛌𝛌, from either the correlation or

covariance matrix of original data

𝐋𝐋 = 𝛄𝛄√𝛌𝛌

(III-12)

It is important to note that the absolute values produced are always less than one and that
covariance and correlation matrices produce different values. This research used the
correlation matrix because the characteristics were measured on widely different scales,
although the resulting matrices were eventually normalized to solve singularity problems.
Once the loading matrix is calculated, the first principal component (first column)
is evaluated to determine which characteristics load greater than a certain absolute value;
this research used an empirically generated value of 0.2 as a cutoff point. The values for
only these characteristics are retained as the new baseline data and future data collection
is only performed on these characteristics until a new baseline is established. There is not
necessarily a mathematical reason this method should work; however, there are four
reasons it is advantageous:
1. It is a unique method for dimensionality reduction, typically decreasing
the amount of data to be retained and compared by over two-thirds
2. Retaining highly loaded characteristics from only the first component
provides optimum discrimination between the baseline and future data
3. This method for choosing the feature set is completely opaque to an
outside observer, and thus highly resistant to reverse engineering
4. The feature set changes every time a baseline is established, further
reducing a hacker’s chances of reproducing “normal” looking conditions
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The choice of using characteristics from only the first principal component was
also empirically determined. At first, n components were retained until they explained
80% of the variance of the p characteristics, such that
∑𝐧𝐧
𝟏𝟏 𝛌𝛌𝐢𝐢
𝐩𝐩

= 𝟎𝟎. 𝟖𝟖

(III-13)

Then, all characteristics that loaded higher than 0.2 on every retained component were
kept. However, the same characteristics load repeatedly on different components, and the
number of uniquely loaded characteristics rapidly decreases as the number of retained
components is increased. Next, the heuristic of retaining only those eigenvalues greater
than one was applied (Kaiser’s criterion) but there were still too many retained
characteristics. Finally, it was determined that keeping only the first component’s
characteristics was sufficient to discriminate while providing the minimum number of
retained values. In this research, the number of retained characteristics was generally
about 310-330 out of 936-954 original characteristics.
For example, Table 10 shows an example loading matrix for the first six principal
components with 18 characteristics. These six components would account for
(8.287+3.682+1.506+0.937+0.928+0.772)/18 = 89.51% of the variance. In this case, the
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17 and 18 characteristics would all be retained, which is
only a reduction from 18 to 12 dimensions. If the 80% rule is used, then the first four
eigenvalues are kept and we are left with nine characteristics, which is a 50% reduction.
If Kaiser’s criterion is applied, only the first three components are kept, and the retained
characteristics are reduced slightly to seven. This is a significant reduction in
dimensionality, but it has been found empirically that keeping only the first component,
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and in this example only one characteristic, still provides enough discrimination to be
useful.

Component
Eigenvalue
Characteristic
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

1
8.287

2
3.682

3
1.506

4
0.937

5
0.928

6
0.772

-0.15384
0.06142
-0.0336
0.091929
-0.04926
0.071546
-0.10697
0.185519
0.005743
-0.05692
0.144862
-0.17734
0.079405
0.175093
0.039833
-0.07113
-0.21841
-0.03333

-0.07401
-0.12557
-0.17164
0.485113
0.086957
0.155932
-0.00649
-0.02182
-0.0604
-0.05561
0.008105
-0.07986
-0.08628
0.247552
0.137801
-0.06733
-0.21717
-0.11565

0.096476
0.050501
0.544852
0.144811
-0.04442
0.101687
-0.2533
-0.70137
0.12758
-0.19612
-0.17055
-0.24029
-0.14164
-0.27632
0.014215
-0.05017
-0.27561
0.033592

-0.1563
0.169607
-0.08679
0.179635
0.075297
-0.25174
-0.00158
0.266576
-0.13675
-0.13258
0.365728
0.064084
0.094099
0.106642
-0.02605
-0.15586
-0.14524
-0.09906

0.049696
0.177942
-0.36458
-0.08225
-0.0772
0.246949
0.047893
0.374742
-0.08696
0.244851
0.248483
0.315741
0.052438
0.288483
-0.01455
0.242786
-0.02712
0.044157

-0.02757
0.043259
-0.11488
0.424709
-0.02613
0.040774
0.066287
-0.14233
0.105364
-0.03042
0.207989
0.120701
0.008133
-0.20954
0.179396
-0.13835
-0.14616
0.220843

Table 10 – Example PCA Load Matrix

After the baseline of “normality” has been established, it must be compared to the
incoming data. Again, PCA is employed using the correlation matrix (Appendix F –
PCA/Mahalanobis Distance) but during this stage only the eigenvalues which contain
80% of the variance are retained. As before, various methods of dimensionality
reduction were tested, and this time the 80% rule provided optimum discrimination. The
number of retained components after this stage was typically 20-30, which is a 98%
reduction in dimensionality from 936-954.
The loading scores are calculated as shown in Section 2.3.1 where X s is
calculated by subtracting the mean of the baseline data from the new data, then
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standardizing with the inverse square root of the baseline’s covariance matrix. As stated
previously, the eigenvalues used to calculate the loading scores are from the correlation
matrix. Finally, the loading scores and retained eigenvectors are used to calculate a
Mahalanobis distance for each sample as described in the previous section.
3.5.3

Quadratic Discrimination

Although it is easy for a human to visualize the effectiveness of PAIDS when the
Mahalanobis Distance (MD) is plotted, it is useful to generate an actual numerical value
in terms of percentage true and false positive to compare results against other IDSs.
Quadratic Discrimination (QD) conveniently provides these values, although it is
unorthodox to use QD in this case since MD is part of the QD calculation. However, QD
was performed simply to prove the success of the PAIDS algorithm. The QD procedure
and measurement of effectiveness is described in Section 2.4.2.
To perform QD with this data, the MD values from the initial baseline are stored
as “normal” data, and they are compared to the incoming data in a two-way classifier. If
PAIDS were to be implemented in a real system, the first time legitimate activity
occurred the system could be prompted to record additional “normal” data to be used in a
three-way classifier. In this way, the system could learn how to measure “self” and
“other”. Anything that registers in the three-way classifier as something different than
the initial baseline or designated legitimate activity would be labeled an intrusion.
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IV.

Results and Analysis

This research consisted of four main experiments, presented here in chronological
order. As the research progressed, the analysis techniques changed slightly to pursue
avenues that seemed to hold promise for anomaly discrimination. The progression is
depicted as clearly as possible to show how assumptions and results evolved throughout
the process.
4.1

Oct 31 Test – Component Scores
At first, it was hoped a simple plot of the first principal component scores would

offer some distinction between normal and abnormal populations. At the very least, it
provided some insight into the complexity of the problem, and some potential areas of
improvement for future experiments. In this first test, MATLAB was still being used to
run code, so the sample rate was limited to once every two seconds. Also, Internet
connection was still being considered as a possible variable. Finally, the “intrusion”
mechanism in this case was the EICAR standard anti-virus test file and the quirks of
working with (and against) Symantec were still being worked out.
Three runs were completed in this first experiment: normal activity with no
internet connection, normal activity with internet connection, and abnormal activity with
internet connection. The timelines for each run are shown in Table 11 through Table 13.
Sample number was used to maintain consistency between experiments and charts,
because in this case each sample was two seconds apart while the interval in later
experiments was one second.
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Sample Number

Activity on victim computer
Opened Explorer without Internet connection
Opened c:\ prompt, “pinged” from attacking computer
No activity, Explorer window still open
Opened Word, saved file, closed Word
Opened Excel, saved file, closed Excel
Opened c:\ prompt, “pinged” from attacking computer
Opened Word, Excel, Outlook, and PowerPoint
Copied/Pasted between programs
Opened old files, saved and closed new files
No activity, no windows open

1 – 50
51-450
451-500
501- 550
650-700
750-900

901-1000

Table 11 – Oct 31 Run1 (normalnoactivity) Timeline

Sample Number

Activity on victim computer
Opened Explorer with Internet connection
Opened two tabs, searched for possible virus to use
during next phase of experiment

1 – 1000

Table 12 – Oct 31 Run2 (normalinternet) Timeline

Sample Number
1 – 59

60-69
110-119
160- 169
210-219
260-269
310-319
360-369
410-419
460- 469
510
560
700
910

Activity on victim computer
Downloaded EICAR test file from
eicar.org/anti_virus_test_file.htm
Symantec auto-protect instantly deleted file
Disabled Symantec auto-protect
Ran EICAR test file
Ran EICAR test file
Ran EICAR test file
Ran EICAR test file with Symantec enabled
Ran EICAR test file with Symantec enabled
Ran EICAR test file with Symantec enabled
Ran EICAR test file
Ran EICAR test file
Ran EICAR test file
Ran Symantec quick scan
Enabled Symantec auto-protect
Found and quarantined EICAR files
Deleted EICAR files

Table 13 – Oct 31 Run3 (abnormalinternet) Timeline
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The first run, labeled “no activity”, actually had a significant amount of activity,
which was not taken into account during the analysis. For this reason, the dataset was
deemed unusable, but it highlighted the importance of recording an exact account of the
activity during the data collection process. The second run, labeled “normalinternet”,
was taken while connected to the Internet, so there is no guarantee the data is malware
free except that no files were downloaded and it was run on a military connection which
is presumed to be (relatively) secure. Also, the first time malware was intentionally
introduced from the Internet it was caught and deleted instantly by Symantec autoprotect. Workarounds, described in Section 3.4.2, were used to avoid Symantec
throughout the rest of the research.
After the data from these runs was cleaned and processed, the principal
components scores from the first two components were plotted to see if any
discrimination could be made. Figure 13 shows there was indeed a distinction,
particularly between the second and third runs, though there was still some overlap.
31 October Test - Principal Component Scores
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Figure 13 – Oct 31 First Two Principal Component Scores
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The fact that discrimination was apparent in two dimensions was promising, since
it was known the final discrimination would be accomplished in at least 17 dimensions.
It also demonstrated the strength of the first principal component for discrimination,
which was used later to facilitate dimension reduction. This technique definitely did not
give the clarity required for an IDS; plus, the analysis was faulty since “static” processes
had not been identified yet, and columns with zero variance were dropped instead of
being replaced with noise. It was also assessed that a more significant “attack” was
needed to get a measurable result.
Interestingly, when this data was analyzed with the PCA-PCA-MD technique
developed later, the presence of the EICAR file was readily distinguishable (Figure 14).
However, the difference between the operation of this file and normal activity would not
be significant enough to register in quadratic discrimination.
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Figure 14 – Oct 31 Evaluated with PCA-PCA-MD Technique
71

1000

4.2

Nov 7 Test – Component Scores vs. Time
Five runs were accomplished during this test, with 1000 samples of data at a rate

of once per second for each run. The object of this test was to work out the data
problems identified in the first test, so no malware was introduced and no activity was
conducted during any run. Many of the data manipulation techniques used throughout
the research were developed as a result of this test.
The biggest problem with the data collected during these first tests was that
columns with zero variance caused the PCA and FA techniques to fail. These columns
were initially thrown out, however this caused dimensionality discrepancies (comparing
apples to oranges) so the technique of replacing the columns with random noise was
developed as described in Section 3.4.3. Also, the data was badly scaled, since some
measurements were taken in kilobytes while others were a simple count of “number of
threads open by process” so the entire matrix was normalized from 0 to 1 to correct this
problem. These techniques were continued throughout the research.
Also, the monitoring code required MATLAB to be open, which greatly affected
the operating system, memory used, and the speed at which measurements were taken.
Changes were made so a batch file could call TaskInfo directly, but data collection still
required the operation of these two programs (TaskInfo and a command prompt).
However, using the batch file, the data could be collected twice as fast with less impact
on the operating system, so this method was used for the rest of the tests.
Finally, the highly variable nature of the data became readily apparent during the
first two tests. Both between runs and during a single run, system processes were added
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and dropped when programs were open and closed and when automatic operating system
processes (disk scans, etc.) started and stopped. This not only caused problems
comparing data sets, but also with the statistical methods used due to singularity
problems. This problem was corrected by identifying “static” processes as described in
Section 3.4.3 and only recording data for these processes.
However, the first run in this test showed the “static” process technique may also
induce problems. For instance, a DOSscan was occurring during the first eight seconds
of this run, so it was identified as a “static” process, but when the scan was complete it
dropped out of the stack and the algorithm was stuck recording too many processes. This
caused dimension problems and gave the system a false sense of self. This discrepancy
can be seen in the wildly different scores for run 1 plotted in Figure 15.
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Figure 15 – Nov 7 First Two Principal Scores All Runs

Based on these observations, it is imperative that the total number of processes
recorded by PAIDS is established at startup after all beginning transient processes have
closed and before recurring automatic processes begin. This technique also assumes the
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system is not infected at startup since any intrusion at that point would be incorporated
into the sense of self.
Another conclusion from this test was that a plot of PCA scores over time would
not be useful. It was hoped some type of variable control limit could be placed on the
values of these scores which would be exceeded under anomalous conditions such as an
intrusion. Instead, as can be seen in the figures below, it was found that this data by itself
was too highly variable to be of value. Thus, the idea of calculating a Mahalanobis
Distance between component scores was introduced.
Component Scores vs Time
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Figure 17 – Nov 7 Run2 First Three PCA Scores vs. Time
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Figure 19 – Nov 7 Run4 First Three PCA Scores vs. Time
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Figure 20 – Nov 7 Run5 First Three PCA Scores vs. Time

4.3

Nov 21 Test – Principal Component Analysis-Mahalanobis Distance
(PCA-MD)
Once the data problems had been resolved, a new, more realistic, attack had to be

found. Various hacker websites were visited, as described in Section 3.4.2, before the
backdoor Trojan, Sub7, was identified as an ideal candidate. This exploitation was used
throughout the rest of the research. During this test, the design of experiment presented
in Appendix J – Nov21 Test Plan was used during a single log-on session. It was hoped
that using a single log-on would decrease the chances of problems caused by a different
number or order of “static” processes.
Even with the precautions taken, the first 11 runs had an extra process running,
which had to be deleted from the historical record before analysis could be performed.
This system process is described at www.ProcessLibrary.com (Uniblue, 2008):
ccapp

Stands for Common Client Application and is the executable responsible for
checking emails and auto-protect facilities as part of the Norton Antivirus suite.
The ccapp.exe file is used as the Norton Antivirus’ real-time scanner executing
behind the scenes, scanning your system for Trojan Horses, viruses, and worms.

So even after auto-protect had been disabled, there was still a process running in the
background attempting to detect malware. This demonstrated how convoluted
background processes can be and the importance that “static” processes established at
start-up are not actually transient.
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Once the data had been scrubbed to ensure the same processes were being
compared against each other, it was necessary to determine which sets of data to
compare. First, some terms were required.
•

Clean – data with no activity and no malware

•

Dirty – data with activity

•

Infected – data with malware

To prove the Mahalanobis Distance technique was valid, a first attempt was made
to compare a run to itself, which should in theory result in a very low MD, though not
necessarily zero. Therefore, Run7 (clean) was used with the entire dataset as the
“baseline” with the results presented in Figure 21. This showed that, while highly
variable, the MD was relatively low for a dataset compared to itself as expected.
However, there was an unusual result when compared to another clean dataset (Run10)
using the entirety of Run7 as a baseline. Since both these runs were at level one activity
with no malware, it was expected that a similarly low MD would result, however, Figure
22 shows this was not the case (notice the scale of the MD on the Y axis).

77

Nov21 Run7 vs Run7 all

1000
900

Mahalanobis Distance

800
700
600
500
400
300
200

0

100

200

300

400

500
600
Seconds

700

800

900

1000

Figure 21 – Nov 21 Run7 (clean) All vs. Run7 (clean) All
8

14

Nov21 Run7 vs. Run10 all

x 10

12

Mahalanobis Distance

10

8

6

4

2

0
0

100

200

300

400

500
600
Seconds

700

800

900

Figure 22 – Nov 21 Run7 (clean) All vs. Run10 (clean) All
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1000

These results suggest that the dataset used as a baseline makes a great deal of
difference both in terms of when the window for data collection occurs and how long the
window lasts. The first problem is caused by changing conditions of the operating
system, and can be solved with a rolling window, periodic updates, or event driven
updates to the baseline. The latter issue affects the memory and processing capacity
required, since it takes more of both to analyze a longer window of collected data without
improving the result. It also suggests the introduction of noise into the data may have an
effect, and that the number of variables to be analyzed might need to be reduced.
At this point, it was possible to distinguish one dataset from another, but this did
little to discriminate normal from abnormal let alone legitimate from illegitimate activity.
For instance, when Run7 (clean) was concatenated with Run13 (dirty) and Run12
(infected) to simulate continuous data, the result was inconclusive (Figure 23). It was
obvious there was a difference between the baseline data (first 1000 seconds) and other
data, but there was still no distinction between dirty (second 1000 seconds) and infected
data (last 1000 seconds).
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Figure 23 – Nov 21 Run7 vs. Run7(clean), Run13(dirty), and Run12(infected)

In fact, after some investigation, it was determined that it was only possible to
distinguish between the window of data used as the baseline and any other data. It was
clear from these results that distinctions could be made between datasets; however, the
time and data required to make such discriminations was considerable. For instance,
MATLAB took 56.7 seconds to generate Figure 22 and 107.9 seconds for Figure 23,
while a 1000x936 matrix (1000 seconds of 936 variables) takes up approximately 5,000
KB of memory. Obviously, if PAIDS was to be an effective deterrent it would have to
react faster to an intrusion, and if it were to be used on a MANET it would need to use
less memory. Thus, less data had to be collected and analyzed while still providing the
same or better level of discrimination in less time. During the course of the next test,
alterations to the algorithm and observations of the resulting data provided significant
improvements in memory load, processing speed, and accuracy of discrimination.
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4.4

Nov 25 Test – PCA-PCA-MD
The next test was conducted to reduce the complexity of the data and to refine the

data collection process so a more efficient algorithm could be designed. It concentrated
on finding the key variables needed to discriminate between datasets and fine tuning the
dimension and sample reduction techniques necessary to considerably decrease the
amount of data required. There were only three runs during this test, and the victim
computer was shutdown and cleaned between each run with a five minute “warm-up”
period after being turned on. Sample numbers were determined by analysis of the
resulting data files which showed when programs were opened and closed.
Sample Number

Activity on victim computer
No activity, except for batch file
Introduced Sub7 v1.5 into system from thumb drive

1 – 999
1000 - 2000

Table 14 – Nov 25 Run1 (clean/infected) Timeline

Sample Number

Activity on victim computer
No activity, except for batch file
Opened programs and data as follows:
Notepad – looked at .txt files
MATLAB – imported data
Excel – opened file with links to other files
Word – opened file with embedded macros
Powerpoint – opened file and manipulated it
Explorer – opened without Internet connection
TaskInfo – opened and took screenshot

1 – 1002
1003 – 2000
1015
1146
1299
1448
1599
1748
1897

Table 15 – Nov 25 Run2 (clean/dirty) Timeline

Sample Number

Activity on victim computer

No activity, except for batch file
1 – 666
Opened programs and data as in Run2
667 – 1334
1335 (1405) – 2000 Introduced Sub7 v1.5 into system from thumb drive
Table 16 – Nov 25 Run3 (clean/dirty/infected) Timeline
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As with the Nov 21 test, Symantec AntiVirus auto-protect had to be disabled
throughout the test, but in this case the data did not need to be massaged afterwards
because the “static” processes were the same. Programs once started were not stopped,
and when the backdoor was opened, all of the various activities available were conducted
to simulate an intrusion. During the last run, the computer was running so slowly from
all the open programs that effects from the intrusion did not appear for nearly half a
minute on the victim computer after they were initiated on the attacking computer (thus
the sample number in parentheses) and eventually caused runtime errors which shutdown
MATLAB and Excel.
While performing analysis of this data, singularity problems appeared again, and
it was at this point that the floating point error was discovered, requiring the use of <10-11
instead of =0 (Appendix E – Principal Component Analysis Baseline – Line 20) as well
as the need to reintroduce noise during the PCA process in addition to the import process.
This was because smaller sample sizes were taken from the original data, and some
columns once again contained all zeros, where in the larger data set there was at least one
number to prevent the introduction of noise. In an actual application of PAIDS, the noise
will only need to be introduced one time after the sample is taken.
In an attempt to reduce the amount of data recorded, an effort was made to find
the key variables to discrimination. Initially, all eigenvectors with eigenvalues less than
one were thrown out (Kaiser’s Criterion) but in some cases only a single component
remained, which did not provide any discrimination (Figure 24). A graphical method to
determine the cutoff point such as Johnson’s secant method is possible, but it takes much
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less time and effort to retain eigenvalues that explain a certain percentage of the variance.
This research used 80% with good results (Figure 25); however, future work might
attempt a graphical solution or investigate different percentages to see if they provide
better discrimination. Also, using the MATLAB command COV on standardized data
instead of CORR on centered data (Appendix F – PCA/Mahalanobis Distance – Line 55)
provided an order of magnitude decrease in processing time.
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Figure 24 – Nov 25 Run1 (clean) vs. Run1 (clean/infected) - Kaiser’s Criterion
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A major breakthrough was made in data reduction when it was discovered that
variables which loaded heaviest on the first principal component of the baseline data
were sufficient to discriminate between subsequent datasets. Originally, the factor
loading matrix was observed to determine if a smaller common set of variables were
important to intrusion detection. Details of the development of this technique are found
in Section 3.5.2 and results are described in Section 4.3. The most important result was
using these factor loadings to select key variables to collect and analyze.
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Figure 26 – Nov 25 Run1 (clean) vs. Run1 (clean/infected) - Key Variables

Now, instead of comparing all 900+ variables, PCA is performed on the baseline
dataset, and only those variables which load higher than the absolute value of 0.2 on the
first principal component are retained. This eliminates the noisy and low variability data,
then PAIDS only collects data on the reduced set. When PCA is performed again on the
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reduced data set, the number of retained components is less than 30, which is more than a
97% reduction in dimensionality, and the discrimination is much better (Figure 26).
Another major effort to reduce the amount of data was in determining an optimum
period of time data that should be recorded (the sample window) to establish the baseline.
Initially when developing the model, the entire period of known “normal” data was used
as the baseline, but this was simply to prove the concept of distinction. During this test,
three minute, two minute, one minute, 30 second, 20 second and 10 second intervals from
the start of known periods of inactivity were used as a baseline. The procedure was:
•

Run Appendix E – Principal Component Analysis Baseline on the first
period of data taken during the run (i.e. first 10, 20, or 30 seconds, etc.)

•

Reduce the database to the key variables identified in the baseline process

•

Use these reduced datasets in Appendix F – PCA/Mahalanobis Distance to
produce final results

Discrimination was not as good as later tests which used rolling and periodic windows,
but it indicated the length of the baseline window was significant, and suggested variable
lengths might be beneficial. Recurrence of data collection was addressed in another test.
Results varied slightly for all categories (processing time, components retained,
etc.) but typical results of these comparisons are depicted on the following pages. Based
on these results, it was determined 20 seconds was the optimum amount of data to retain
as a baseline in terms of memory used, time needed to record and analyze data, and most
importantly accuracy in discrimination.
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Baseline
Baseline
Key
Discrimination Principal
Processing Variables Processing
Components Database
Size (KB)
Retained
Sample Length Time (Sec) Retained Time (Sec)
10 sec
3.875830
572
0.979272
7
30
20 sec
3.826673
427
0.513489
13
41
30 sec
3.724152
320
0.337810
18
45
60 sec
3.419391
202
0.216404
25
52
120 sec
3.421965
114
0.127510
14
39
180 sec
3.117276
104
0.092684
4
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Figure 27 – Nov25 Run1 (clean/infected) PCA-PCA-MD Comparisons
86

Baseline
Key
Discrimination Principal
Baseline
Processing Variables Processing
Components Database
Retained
Size (KB)
Sample Length Time (Sec) Retained Time (Sec)
10 sec
3.904401
585
1.048655
7
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20 sec
3.825657
410
0.477722
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30 sec
3.732138
326
0.347049
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60 sec
3.361985
244
0.230664
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120 sec
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0.118346
4
35
180 sec
3.138091
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0.109284
3
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Figure 28 – Nov25 Run2 (clean/dirty) PCA-PCA-MD Comparisons
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Sample Length Time (Sec) Retained Time (Sec)
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Figure 29 – Nov25 Run3 (clean/dirty/infected) PCA-PCA-MD Comparisons
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The last decision to be made was how often the baseline should be updated.
Some possibilities were:
•

Session-driven – a single baseline established at start-up

•

Time-driven – once every two minutes (or other periodic interval)

•

Event-driven – based on user input when MD change exceeds limits

•

Continuous – latest sample replaces earliest after being compared to
existing baseline for anomaly (rolling window)

To decide the optimum update rate, comparisons were made between different
baseline lengths and times to see how they affected discrimination. In other words, for a
given dataset of clean, dirty, and infected data, the baseline was established at different
times (at start-up, after a certain period of time, or immediately before and after transition
to an altered state) and the discrimination between data was observed. The data from the
Nov 21 test was primarily used for these comparisons.
Before embarking on this experiment, some assumptions had to be checked. If
only the first 20 seconds of Run7 are used as the baseline, it was expected that the first 20
seconds would have a lower MD (since they are in effect being compared to themselves)
and the remaining time would either be close to the same or slowly increasing as
conditions changed. The results are presented in Figure 30, and though the low MD
values last for 21 seconds instead of 20 as expected, the increase in MD is sharp and
much greater than expected.
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Figure 30 – Nov 21 Run7 First 20s vs. Run7 (clean) All

These intuitive results are far from typical. When the same experiment was
completed on the other “clean” datasets, similar results were expected; however, the MD
actually starts high and gradually decreases to near zero (Figure 31). Interestingly, when
the baseline window was increased in an attempt to “even” the MD out, the change only
exacerbated the spikes in the data and did nothing to decrease the initial value. In fact,
none of the runs achieved the expected form, but runs 7 and 15 were considered most
useable since they didn’t contain large spikes. Clearly, the window size made a
difference, but it was not entirely clear why the MD decreased towards zero instead of the
other way around. Despite these counterintuitive results and the occasional spikes in
MD, the results showed a dramatic difference between clean, dirty and infected data,
which boded well for the next step: discrimination.
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Figure 31 – Nov 21 Clean Runs First 20s vs. All Data
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Figure 32 – Nov21 Clean Runs with Various Baseline Window Lengths
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Figure 33 – Nov21 Run7 with Various Baseline Window Lengths

It was expected that a measurement of clean data would have a lower MD when
compared to itself or other clean data than when compared to dirty or infected data. In
some cases, such as Figure 34 this was the case, while in others, such as Figure 35 it was
not. Again, it was unclear why this should be the case, though it seemed highly
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dependent on baseline window size; however, it can easily be seen that discrimination
was visually possible between clean, dirty, and infected datasets.
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Figure 34 – Nov 21 Run7 First 40s vs. Run7 (clean) and Run13 (dirty)

The case of interest, of course, was determining whether activity was legitimate or
illegitimate, so a clean dataset (Run7) was concatenated with dirty (Run13) and infected
datasets (Run12) to simulate continuous data from the same system under normal use and
intrusion. Figure 35 shows the results of using a 20 second baseline generated at
(simulated) start-up, while Figure 36 shows the effect of updating the baseline just prior
to the transition to dirty data, and Figure 37 shows the effect of updating the baseline just
after legitimate activity has begun. If the window for the baseline was doubled to 40
seconds after legitimate activity began, the result was dramatically improved (Figure 38).
These examples emphasized the need to re-establish a sense of self when system
conditions change and re-iterated the efficacy of an event-driven baseline update;
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however, they also suggest the baseline window size may need to change depending on
conditions.
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Figure 35 – Nov 21 Run7 first 20s vs. Run7 (clean) Run13 (dirty) and Run12 (infected)
Nov21 385key Run7 last 20s (clean) vs. Run7 last 20s, Run13 (dirty), Run12 (infected) - 14 PCs
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Figure 36 – Nov 21 Run7 last 20s vs. Run7 last 20s (clean) Run13 (dirty) Run12 (infected)
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Figure 37 – Nov 21 Run13 first 20s vs. Run13 (dirty) and Run12 (infected)
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Figure 38 – Nov 21 Run13 first 40s vs. Run13 (dirty) and Run12 (infected)
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4.5

PCA-PCA-MD-QD
The values for the Mahalanobis Distance (MD) between Principal Component

scores provide a valid method for discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
activity, however a measurement of effectiveness is needed to compare the results against
other IDSs. Quadratic Discrimination (QD) provides a means to test the efficiency of this
method as described in Section 3.5.3.
When the MDs from the Nov25 tests (Figure 27 - Figure 29) were input to
quadratic discriminators, using the first 20 seconds as a baseline and comparing all the
data, the results were as follows:
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Figure 39 – Nov25 Quadratic Discrimination with Individual Covariance Matrices
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Figure 40 – Nov25 Quadratic Discrimination with Pooled Covariance Matrices

From these results, it is easy to see that using a pooled covariance matrix instead
of individual covariance matrices provides better discrimination. Predictably, the worst
error was encountered when trying to distinguish legitimate activity (dirty) from intrusion
(infected) during Run3. The false positive rate (identifying legitimate activity as
illegitimate) was 40/666 = 6.01% but the false negative rate (identifying illegitimate
activity as legitimate) was only 3/666 = 0.45% which is outstanding. Similar results were
obtained with other test data. For instance, Run7 (clean), Run13 (dirty), and Run12
(infected) concatenated data produced no false positives and a 98.29% detection rate:
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Figure 41 - Nov21 Quadratic Discrimination with Pooled Covariance Matrices
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4.6

Comparison to other IDSs
Although it is always difficult and dangerous to compare different data sets and

techniques, PAIDS compares well to other IDSs, such as NIDES which had a 77.7% true
positive rate and 1% false positive rate (Anderson, Frivold, & Valdes, 1995) and a
genetic algorithm tested on KDD 1999 Cup data with a 95.47% true positive and 10.63%
false positive rate (Kabiri & Ghorbani, 2005). Other anomaly-based algorithms (Figures
42-44) performed better against network attacks with respect to false positives but were
not adaptable to changes in real-time.
Some research suggests that if “the cost of acting on a false positive [is]
sufficiently low” (Fox, Kiciman, & Patterson, 2004) that the number of false positives is
irrelevant, but it is always a good idea to try to reduce them as much as possible while
still providing an acceptable true positive rate. An extensive inspection of issues in false
positive rates for IDSs was performed by Mell, et al. in 2003. By adjusting the control
limits placed on Mahalanobis Distance in PAIDS, it would be possible to decrease the
false positive rate while maintaining its high true positive rate.

Figure 42 - IDS effectiveness rates (Wong & Lai, 2006)
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Figure 43 - IDS effectiveness rates (Huang & Lee, 2003)

Figure 44 - Comparison of IDS effectiveness (Chen, Dai, Li, & Cheng, 2007)
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4.7

Key Operating System Processes
In an attempt to sell anti-virus and scanning software, companies often resort to

vague and ominous threats. Uniblue offers a typical pitch: “In the recesses of your
computer, 20-30 invisible processes run silently in the background. Some hog system
resources, turning your PC into a sluggish computer. Worse yet, other useless processes
harbour spyware and Trojans - violating your privacy and giving hackers free reign on
your computer. Uniblue ProcessLibrary is an invaluable resource for anyone who wants
to know the exact purpose of every single process.” (Uniblue, 2008) However, more
often than not, the scanning software offered contains spyware and phishing programs
designed to advertise more anti-virus software and instill fear of further infection.
Unfortunately, the operating system software has become so complex that even experts
are often unsure of what a process really does.
Principal Component Analysis was used to highlight which processes were most
significant in discriminating normal from abnormal systems. Using empirical data, any
loads with absolute values greater than 0.2 were considered highly loaded. The four
processes which loaded highly on the first principal component from clean data for all
three runs of the Nov 25 test data were: cmd.exe, csrss.exe, lsass.exe and svchost.exe.
Although these are only a few of the process characteristics retained, they are indicative
of the processes that are relevant to intrusion detection and some of the efforts by hackers
to avoid discovery. The website www.ProcessLibrary.com (Uniblue, 2008) describes
these processes as having the following functions.
cmd

Allows access to the Microsoft Windows Command Prompt, also known as
Microsoft DOS. To-date, cmd.exe is a 32-bit command prompt used in
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Windows NT, 2000, and XP and offers disk and file maintenance functions to
your computer as well as network functions. This program is a non-essential
system process, but should not be terminated unless suspected to be causing
problems.
csrss

The Microsoft Client Server Runtime Server subsystem utilizes the process
csrss.exe for managing the majority of the graphical instruction sets under the
Microsoft Windows operating system. As such Csrss.exe provides the critical
functions of the operating system, and its termination can result in the Blue
Screen of Death being displayed.
Csrss.exe controls threading and Win32 console window features. Threading is
where the application splits itself into multiple simultaneous running tasks.
Threads supported by csrss.exe are different from processes in that threads are
commonly contained within the process, with various threads sharing resources
within the same process. The Win32 console is the plain text window in the
Windows API system (programs can use the console without the need for image
display).
In mobile devices such as notebooks and laptops, the process csrss.exe is
closely dependent on power management schemes implemented by the system
as defined under the Control Panel option.

lsass

The process lsass.exe serves as the Local Security Authentication Server by
Microsoft, Inc. It is responsible for the enforcement of the security policy within
the operating system. This process checks whether a user’s supplied
identification is valid or not whenever he or she tries to access the computer
system.
With the execution of the file lsass.exe, the system acquires security by
preventing the access of unwanted users to any private information. The file
lsass.exe also handles the password modifications done by the user.
The process lsass.exe mainly operates in the system through its ability to create
access tokens. These tokens encapsulate the file’s security descriptor, which
contains the necessary information to process user authentication such as data
on which user holds access to the system and whether the access is mandatory
or discretionary.

svchost The file svchost.exe is the Generic Host Process for Win32 Services used for
administering 16-bit-based dynamically linked library files (DLL files)
including other supplementary support applications.
As operating systems became more complex Microsoft decided to run more
software functionality from a dynamic link library (DLL) interface. However
DLLs are unable to launch themselves and require at least one executable
program, i.e. svchost.exe, is needed to bridge between the library process and
the operating system.
Through the solitary file svchost.exe, the DLLs efficiently contain and dispense
Win32 services as well as neatly facilitate the execution of svchost.exe’s own
operations. Acting as a host, the file svchost.exe creates multiple instances of
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itself. The multiple executions of the file svchost.exe contribute to the stability
and security of the operating system by reducing the possibility of a crashing
process that causes a domino effect on its neighbor processes, thereby creating a
system-wide crash in the machine.
However, even when a process appears legitimate, “determining whether [a
process] is a virus or a legitimate Windows process depends on the directory location it
executes or runs from.” (Uniblue, 2008) Hackers often make minor alterations in
legitimate process names to “hide” in the operating system. Uniblue lists lsasss.exe,
svhost.exe and csrsc.exe as three of the top five security threats. (Uniblue, 2008) These
are malware versions of legitimate processes associated with the w32/Sasser.E worm,
W32.mydoomI@mm worm and W32.spybot.cf backdoor trojan respectively. You will
notice that they are very close to three of the four processes highlighted by PCA as being
significant for detecting intrusion.
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V.
5.1

Discussion

Conclusions
PAIDS monitors “static” processes running at the host level to develop a sense of

“self” which can be analyzed for anomalies to detect intrusions by malware. This offers a
last layer of defense in a multi-layered intrusion detection system which should also
include physical, operational, and network security. The baseline data representing
“normality” can be updated in near-real-time and since the recorded variables change
over time and are discriminated in an 18 dimensional feature space, the IDS is highly
resistant to reverse engineering or other hacking efforts. PAIDS would be most efficient
on a platform outside the operating system to be monitored, such as a hardware primitive
or software at the kernel level or below.
Data collection for the PAIDS algorithm is sensitive to window length and
recurrence, as both these variables significantly change the results of Principal
Component Analysis and Mahalanobis Distance. Empirical data implies that 20 seconds
of baseline data is sufficient for discrimination while limiting the use of memory and
processing time and that an event-driven update of the baseline is most appropriate.
Mahalanobis Distance between selected Principal Component scores from host-level
process characteristics over time is adequate for an analyst to detect an intrusion, though
some known uninfected historical data is necessary to train the IDS to recognize
legitimate activity. Preliminary data has shown that PAIDS can reliably produce greater
than a 98% success rate in discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate activity
with less than a 6% false positive rate.

103

5.2

Limitations
As is true with most IDSs, PAIDS is a purely reactive program, and will only

detect an intrusion after it has begun. Thus, it is a last resort line of defense, notifying the
user when the actual attack is occurring, rather than preventing the attack from
happening. PAIDS assumes the system is not infected at start-up, since the intrusion
would then be incorporated into the sense of “self” and operation of the malware would
not be detected as an anomaly. Also, different operating systems may require different
implementations of the algorithm, which would have to be developed separately. Finally,
PAIDS uses multivariate statistical analysis methods which require relatively powerful
mathematical programming, which may or may not be available in lightweight software
or hardware primitives functioning outside the monitored operating system.
The methods used in this research required the output of one program to be
analyzed by another program; however, any efficient application of PAIDS will have to
take measurements directly from the operating system instead of relying on additional
software to provide the data. This is primarily because the collection and analysis rate of
any software is too slow to detect an anomaly in time to make a difference. The
secondary reason is for security purposes, so a kernel rootkit or similar attack will not be
able to subvert the collected data. It is not known if this technique is fully resistant to an
attack that manipulates the process data itself, however, if the monitors are outside the
operating system this would not be a factor. Multi-context primitive hardware monitors
such as those suggested by Mott (2007) and Hart (2007) would be able to record the
appropriate data, but software working outside the monitored operating system would
probably be required to analyze the data.
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5.3

Contributions
Very few IDSs use host-level system processes to identify intrusions. Using

anomalies in hardware characteristics is a powerful tool because it does not rely on
signature databases and it is not subject to standard spoofing like packet analysis can be.
Instead, PAIDS can detect the operation of malware using subtle changes in the operating
system that the user may not be aware of and that other anti-virus software is not
designed to recognize. This is analogous to an expert observer “knowing” something is
wrong with the computer due to sluggish or altered operation, yet not being able to
identify exactly what is causing the problem. With PAIDS, the user no longer needs to
be a computer analyst to know there is something wrong with the computer, but will still
need help finding the actual malware and cleaning the system.
Also, most anomaly IDSs rely on historical data which is updated once per
session at best, and often no faster than daily or weekly. PAIDS updates its baseline in
near-real-time so that legitimate changes in the operating system can be incorporated into
the definition of normality. This may require some user input when opening legitimate
programs, but this is a small price to pay for security. Not only does the sense of self
update in near-real-time, but the feature set it uses is completely opaque to an outside
observer and also changes from baseline to baseline, so it is highly resistant to reverse
engineering and hacking.
The opacity in the IDS is primarily due to the use of Mahalanobis Distance
between Principal Component scores to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
activity, which is another valuable contribution which has not been used in any other IDS
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before. Also, the use of PCA to identify key variables loaded on the first principal
component as a dimension reduction method, though unorthodox, is highly effective and
increases the security of the IDS by changing the feature set in near-real-time while
providing significant discrimination.
Adding random noise to columns of zero variance to avoid singularity and infinite
value problems was an original solution to a difficult idiosyncrasy in matrix comparisons.
This technique is only applicable if individual variables cannot be thrown out for reasons
of data and dimension consistency such as existed in this research. In other words, if
datasets from different populations must be compared, but columns of zero variance
occur in different characteristics of each population, then this technique is valid. Also,
the dataset must be normalized, or the noise must be scaled to naturally occurring levels
of activity, otherwise the noise may show up as anomalous and result in a false positive.
Finally, setting up a “laboratory” to investigate malware is always a unique
experience due to the potential volatility and infective nature of many computer viruses.
The use of stand-alone laptops connected with a crossover cable solved a variety of
problems, such as the need to measure hardware characteristics, which was not possible
using virtual machines, and the requirement for a network connection to run the backdoor
client-server application without subjecting the victim system to a real network with
possible unknown intrusion attempts. Though undoubtedly this system configuration has
been used before, this research further validated this particular technique for testing the
effects of known malware on an IDS.

106

5.4

Future Research
Obviously, this method must be tested using other types of malware and intrusion

techniques to ensure it is valid. Also, PAIDS could be tested on different operating
systems (LINUX, UNIX, etc.) by analyzing the applicable process data or other available
hardware information. Some consideration was given to recovering additional
information from the hardware, such as battery life as suggested by Buennemeyer, et al.
(2007) or GPS location and velocity (Zhang, Lee, & Huang, 2003), but this would add
significant complexity to the experiment. However, this data could easily be
incorporated into the proposed PAIDS, and would be a valuable addition for
discrimination in mobile ad-hoc networks.
Adding this type of detector to primitive hardware monitors or non-resident
software is key to the successful implementation of PAIDS or any truly effective hostbased IDS. This would ensure integrity of the IDS as well as provide the necessary
system speed to catch an intrusion before too much damage occurred. Obviously, the
methods demonstrated in this research are only a proof of concept and they would have to
be incorporated into specially designed hardware or software. However, this is beyond
the ability of the author and will have to be accomplished by an actual computer
engineer.
Optimizing the data collection times and dimension reduction techniques would
also be important to fielding this IDS. An experiment determining whether a rolling or
periodic window is more appropriate than an event-driven one might help improve the
PAIDS solution. Although 10 seconds was definitely too short and 120 seconds too long,
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20 seconds was chosen because it seemed to provide a good solution in a limited amount
of time, and was not necessarily based on solid mathematical analysis. A rolling window
has the danger of incorporating anomalies into the normal baseline, while a periodic
window may not be responsive enough to changing conditions; however, it might
eliminate the need for user input which has been a major complaint of security systems
such as the one found on Microsoft Vista. A variable sized window might also be
effective based on the existing conditions of the system.
Dimension reduction could be based on Johnson’s secant method instead of
retaining data with 80% of the variance, or a smaller percentage may provide the same or
better discrimination. Also, Factor Analysis could be performed on the key variables to
identify which processes or characteristics are most valuable to anomaly detection. This
may also provide insight into the function of many intrusions. Comparison of results
when using a covariance versus a correlation matrix when performing Principal
Component Analysis might be valuable. Finally, an investigation to prove process
characteristics and samples are truly independent, or to prove that introduction of noise
into the data does not significantly affect the solution would validate some assumptions
made in this research.
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Appendix A – Output Data from TaskInfo in Excel Format
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0

0

0

0

0

3063

28

0

0

2 Very Idle

5.1

0

0

0

0

0

0:09

0:09

938

240

28

1,876

5.1

842

0

0

0

0

80 Norm

0

392

176

3,800

4,096

1,788

26,500

12 High

winlogon.exe

660

0:01

0:01

0

4,580

6,728

54,484

21 High

0:20

0:16

793

4,472

2,328

38,012

50

6,768

3,988

42,840

11

5,096

2,832

62,472

0

4,628

2,068

38,144

13

24,204

15,588

svchost.exe

1052
1112

svchost.exe

1764

EvtEng.exe

1868

S24EvMon.exe

724

WLKeeper.exe

924

0.73%

0.72%

Session ID

0

29

svchost.exe

Up Time

0

0:02

2.17%

Start Time

0

0:03

2.17%

GDI Obj

5.1

232

756

USER Obj

2 Hard

1892

768

Windows

0

smss.exe

lsass.exe

Handles

0

csrss.exe

services.exe

OS VerState

0

32:53:00

93.49% 32:53:00
0.72%

0:03

0:02

0:01

0:13

0:11

0

12,372

8,792

998

11,700

9,224

0

13,032

8,856

3 ANorm+1

5.1 32 NT Na

0

0

0

10/31/2008 8:52

34:43:00

0

639

0

63

68

10/31/2008 8:52

34:41:00

0

4 32 GUI

537

0

16

50

10/31/2008 8:52

34:38:00

0

17 Norm+1

4 32 GUI

357

0

2

4

10/31/2008 8:52

34:38:00

0

24 Norm+1

4 32 GUI

421

0

2

4

10/31/2008 8:52

34:38:00

0

21 Norm

4 32 GUI

218

0

1

4

10/31/2008 8:52

34:37:00

0

10 Norm

4 32 GUI

417

0

1

4

10/31/2008 8:52

34:36:00

0

105,112 66 Norm

4 32 GUI

1,566

0

30

11 10/31/2008 8:52

34:36:00

0

187

193,604
151,976
139,824

5.1 32 NT Na

21

11 Norm

4 32 GUI

0

10

4

10/31/2008 8:52

34:36:00

0

8 Norm

4 32 GUI

282

2

13

13

10/31/2008 8:52

34:34:00

0

5 Norm

4 32 GUI

189

2

6

12

10/31/2008 8:52

34:34:00

0

svchost.exe

1216

64

2,940

1,156

28,412

6 Norm

4 32 GUI

62

0

1

4

10/31/2008 8:52

34:34:00

0

svchost.exe

1460

0

4,484

1,764

37,972

13 Norm

4 32 GUI

217

0

1

4

10/31/2008 8:52

34:34:00

0

ccSetMgr.exe

1688

0

4,112

3,796

44,992

7 Norm

4 32 GUI

198

0

1

4

10/31/2008 8:53

34:33:00

0

ccEvtMgr.exe

1840

0

2,812

3,952

43,624

19 Norm

4 32 GUI

305

0

1

4

10/31/2008 8:53

34:33:00

0

WLTRYSVC.EXE

1920

0

1,632

432

2 Norm

4 32 Con

35

0

1

4

10/31/2008 8:53

34:33:00

0

bcmwltry.exe

15,208

1996

4

6,560

2,828

48,948

4 Norm

4 32 GUI

156

3

15

15 10/31/2008 8:53

34:33:00

0

spoolsv.exe

176

0

5,188

3,356

45,836

12 Norm

4 32 GUI

128

0

4

4

10/31/2008 8:53

34:33:00

0

SCardSvr.exe

312

7

2,644

928

27,932

7 Norm

4 32 Con

85

0

2

4

10/31/2008 8:53

34:33:00

0

Explorer.EXE

600

30

20,732

13,292

429

DirectCD.exe

328

0

5,252

1,800

WLTRAY.exe

1036

3

5,008

SynTPEnh.exe

1336

0

4,736

0:02

0:01

0:02

12 Norm

4.1 32 GUI

55

118

256

10/31/2008 8:53

34:13:00

0

43,540

91,180

4 Norm

4 32 GUI

113

7

21

19

10/31/2008 8:53

34:12:00

0

1,248

41,476

3 Norm

4 32 GUI

116

3

12

15 10/31/2008 8:53

34:12:00

0

1,544

39,144

4 Norm

4 32 GUI

91

8

22

34:12:00

0

109

42

10/31/2008 8:53

Appendix A – Output Data from TaskInfo in Excel Format (cont.)
User ID

Reads

Read KB

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM
NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM
NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM
NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM
NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM
NT AUTHORITY \ NETWORK SE

Writes

Write KB

Wr Rate B/s

Version

Description

0

0

0

0

0

Interrupts Time Placeholder

0

0

0

0

0

0

DPC Time Placeholder

0

0

0

0

0

0

System Idle Process

0

1,287

4,562

0

System

78,054
NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

Rd Rate B/s

0

47
15,361
525
172
6,499

65,451
26

Company

0

4

0

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Windows NT Session Manager

Microsoft Corporation

1,845

0

0

0

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Client Server Runtime Process

Microsoft Corporation

2,505

0

131

11

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Windows NT Logon Application

Microsoft Corporation

Services and Controller app

Microsoft Corporation

LSA Shell (Export Version)

Microsoft Corporation

21
969

0
1,617

646

2,714

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

5,874

548

2,048 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

92

321

0

13

0

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Generic Host Process for Win32 Services

Microsoft Corporation

100

321

0

21

0

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Generic Host Process for Win32 Services

Microsoft Corporation

5,538

3,071

4,570

5,682 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Generic Host Process for Win32 Services

Microsoft Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

5,173

8,420

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

276

1,065

0

43

21

0 11.1.0.4

Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless Event Log

Intel Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

134

538

0

9

0

0 11, 1, 0, 9

Wireless Management Service

Intel Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

130

530

0

7

0

0 11.1.0.4

WLANKEEPER

Intel(R) Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ NETWORK SE

5

0

0

3

0

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Generic Host Process for Win32 Services

Microsoft Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ LOCAL SERV

16

23

0

14

0

0 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Generic Host Process for Win32 Services

Microsoft Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

456

0

28

18

0 103.5.6.3

Symantec Settings Manager Service

Symantec Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

3,618

442

0

52

2

0 103.5.6.3

Symantec Event Manager Service

Symantec Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

3

0

0

3

0

0

WLTRYSVC.EXE

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

100

331

0

3

1

0 4.100.15.8

Dell Wireless WLAN Card Wireless Network Controller

Dell Inc.

NT AUTHORITY \ SYSTEM

19

23

0

18

0

0 5.1.2600.2696 (xpsp_sp2_gdr.050610-1519)

Spooler SubSystem App

Microsoft Corporation

833

400

11,862

309

148 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158)

Smart Card Resource Management Server

Microsoft Corporation

NT AUTHORITY \ LOCAL SERV

1,971

23,724

LISXP4913LT \ user

1,050

4,853

0

28

6

0 6.00.2900.3156 (xpsp_sp2_gdr.070613-1234)

Windows Explorer

Microsoft Corporation

LISXP4913LT \ user

67

30

0

5

0

0 5.3.5.10

DirectCD Application

Roxio

LISXP4913LT \ user

3

23

0

2

0

0 4.100.15.8

Dell Wireless WLAN Card Wireless Network Tray Applet

Dell Inc.

LISXP4913LT \ user

1

23

0

0

0

0 8.2.4.6 08Mar06

Synaptics TouchPad Enhancements

Synaptics, Inc.
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Appendix B – SubSeven Command Screens

111

Appendix C – TaskInfo Screenshot
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Appendix D – Import Data
1 % This function records system data from freeware product TaskInfo for
% a hardcoded length of time (in seconds) then determines how many
% processes are "static" and collects data for only those processes
% then puts the data into a 2-dimensional array called "cleanoutput"
% which is normalized data with all columns of zero variance changed to % noise.
"rawoutput" is raw data without columns changed.
% ROWS are snapshots in time - intervals are 1 second
% COLUMNS are recorded values of each "static" process in vector format
% for 18 system characteristics in order as follows:
10%
1 - % CPU used by each process
%
2 - % Kernel CPU used by each process
%
3 - # Switches to execution of process/second
%
4 - Physical memory used by process in KB
%
5 - Virtual memory used by process in KB
%
6 - Total virtual address space used by process in KB
%
7 - # Threads currently running in process
%
8 - # Handles opened by process
%
9 - # Windows opened by process
%
10 - # User objects opened by process
20%
11 - # GDI objects opened by process
%
12 - # Read operations issued by process
%
13 - Data read by process in KB
%
14 - Read data rate in bytes/sec
%
15 - # Write operations issued by process
%
16 - Data written by process in KB
%
17 - Write data rate in bytes/sec
%
18 - # of processes beyond the "static" processes running at time
function [rawoutput,cleanoutput] = import_data3
30
for i = 1:2002
j = num2str(i);
filename = strcat(j,'.','txt');
fileID = fopen(filename); % reads output file in order

40

% This subroutine written by Maj Larry Nance
%need to seek down three carriage returns to start on 4th line
temp = fgets(fileID); %reads first line (don't need this line)
temp = fgets(fileID); %reads second line (don't need this line)
temp = fgets(fileID); %reads third line (don't need this line
%now we are on the third line and start recording values
quit = 0;
row = 0;
while quit == 0
row = row + 1;
line = fgets (fileID); %read the next line of the text file
if line == -1 %if we have reached the end of file, quit
quit = 1;
end

50
%Now need to parse the line and assign numbers to variables
quit1 =0;
column = 0;
while quit1 == 0 && quit == 0
[data,line] = strtok(line,9); %go to each tab

60

%get rid of % signs if they are there
leng = size(data,2);
if leng > 0
if data(leng) == '%'
data=data(1:leng-1);
end
end
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% get rid of commas
commaindex = findstr(data,',');
if ~isempty(commaindex)
left = data(1:commaindex-1);
right = data(commaindex+1:leng);
data = strcat(left,right);
end
column = column + 1; %columns

70

% put numbers into proper rows and columns
temp = str2double (data);
if ~isnan(temp)
if size(temp,2) == 1
A(row,column) = temp;
else
A(row,column) = 0;
80
end
else
A(row,column) = 0;
end
if isempty(data)
quit1 = 1;
end
end %while
end %while
% closes output.txt file
90 close = fclose(fileID);
% put process ID numbers from first two samples into temp array
if i == 1
static = zeros(100,2);
end
if i <= 2
static(1:size(A,1),i) = A(:,2);
end
% determine number of "static" processes by comparing PIDs
100 if i == 2
processes = find(logical(static(:,2)-static(:,1)),1,'first')
end
if i > 2
% remove unwanted columns from matrix
temp = [A(:,3:4),A(:,7:11),A(:,15:18),A(:,23:28)];
% calculate and record number of processes running in sample
temp(1,18)=size(temp,1);
% remove unwanted rows from matrix
temp = temp(1:processes,:);
% add data as row vector to output matrix in order of processes
% and characteristics (i.e. starting with first characteristic)
out(i,:) = reshape(temp,1,[]);
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end
end;
% save raw data delete first two lines because they are blank.
rawoutput = out(3:size(out,1),:);
120
% create normalized matrix, if no variance exists in column, change to
% random noise to correct singularity problems later
maxout = max(rawoutput);
stand = std(rawoutput);
for n = 1:size(rawoutput,2)
if stand(n) (n) <= 0.00000000001
cleanoutput(:,n) = rand(size(rawoutput,1),1);
else
cleanoutput(:,n) = rawoutput(:,n)/maxout(n);
130
end
end
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Appendix E – Principal Component Analysis Baseline
1

% Perform Principal Component Analysis on given data matrices, then
% find highly loaded key variables to determine feature set to be
% collected thus reducing dimensionality of original data
% Inputs required:
% X
= data matrix you want to establish baseline from
%
(for instance, first 30 seconds of collected data)

% Outputs:
10 % key
= key variables with |load|>.2
% z
= Eigenvalues of Correlation Matrix
function [z,key] = PCA_baseline(X)
tic
%create normalized matrices, if no variance exists in column, change
%to random noise to correct singularity problems in corr matrix
maxout = max(X);
stand = std(X);
for n = 1:size(X,2)
20
if stand(n) <= 0.00000000001
X(:,n) = randn(size(X,1),1);
else
X(:,n) = X(:,n)/maxout(n);
end
end
% Find Mean (M) of baseline data then center (XD) and standardize
(XS) data
M = mean(X);
30 E = diag(ones(size(X,1)));
XD = X - E * M;
D = inv(sqrt(diag(diag(cov(X)))));
XS = XD *D;
% calculate Correlation matrix (cor) eigenvalues (LR) and
eigenvectors (AR)
cor = cov(XS);
[AR,LR] = eig(cor);
AR = fliplr(AR);
40 LR = fliplr(flipud(LR));
% calculate loading matrix (LM)
LM = AR * sqrt(LR);
% determine key variables and save in vector (key)
n = 1;
for i=1:size(LM,1)
if abs(LM(i,1)) >= .2
key(n) = i;
50
n = n + 1;
end
end
% display eigenvalues in descending order
z = diag(LR)';
toc
end
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Appendix F – PCA/Mahalanobis Distance
1

% Perform Principal Component Analysis on given data matrices then
% find Mahalanobis Distance between feature space over time and plot
% Inputs required:
% base = baseline data to be compared against
% data = data matrix if you want to compare to nominal

%
%
10 %
%
%
%

Outputs:
Y
= Component Scores Matrix
COR
= Indicator Correlation Matrix
AR
= Eigenvectors of Correlation Matrix
z
= Eigenvalues of Correlation Matrix
MD
= Mahalanobis Distance between Principal Component Scores

function [Y,COR,AR,z,MD,key] = PCA_MD(base,data)
tic
% if only one variable is assigned, assume no baseline data matrix
if nargin == 1
data=base;
20 end
% create normalized matrices and if no variance exists in column,
% change to random noise to correct singularity problems later
maxout = max(base);
stand = std(base);
for n = 1:size(base,2)
if stand(n) <= 0.00000000001
base(:,n) = randn(size(base,1),1);
else
30
base(:,n) = base(:,n)/maxout(n);
end
end
maxout = max(data);
stand = std(data);
for n = 1:size(data,2)
if stand(n) <= 0.00000000001
data(:,n) = rand(size(data,1),1);
else
data(:,n) = data(:,n)/maxout(n);
40
end
end
% Find Mean (M) of baseline data, then center and standardize data
% for baseline (XSB) and data to be analyzed (XSD)
M = mean(base);
EB = diag(ones(size(base,1)));
ED = diag(ones(size(data,1)));
XDB = base - EB * M;
XDD = data - ED * M;
50 D = inv(sqrt(diag(diag(cov(base)))));
XSB = XDB *D;
XSD = XDD *D;
116

% calculate Correlation matrix (cor) and find eigenvalues (LR) and
% eigenvectors (AR)
cor = cov(XSB);
[AR,LR] = eig(COR);
AR = fliplr(AR);
LR = fliplr(flipud(LR));
60 % determine key variables and save in vector (key)
n = 1;
for i=1:size(LM,1)
if abs(LM(i,1)) >= .2
key(n) = i;
n = n + 1;
end
end
% display eigenvalues in descending order
70 z = diag(LR)';
% retain eigenvectors that contain 80% of variance
r = 0;
p = 0;
zs = sum(z);
while p <= .8
r = r + 1;
p = p + z(1,r)/zs;
end
80 AR = AR(:,1:r);
LR = LR(1:r,1:r);
% calculate loading scores (Y) for retained eigenvalues
Y = XS * AR;
% calculate Mahalanobis Distance(MD) for each instantiation and plot
for i = 1:size(Y,1)
MD(i) = Y(i,:)*inv(LR)*(Y(i,:)');
end
90 plot(MD, 'DisplayName', 'MD', 'YDataSource', 'MD'); figure(gcf)
hold on
xlabel('Seconds');
ylabel('Mahalanobis Distance');
hold off
toc
end
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Appendix G – Factor Analysis/Mahalanobis Distance
1

%
%
%
%

%
%
%
%
10 %
%
%
%
%
%
%

Perform Factor Analysis on given data matrices
and find Mahalanobis distance between data sets
Inputs required:
X
= data matrix
Outputs:
FS
= Factor Scores Matrix
FL
= Factor Loading Matrix
h2
= Commonality Matrix
PSI
= Uniqueness Matrix
R
= Actual Correlation Matrix
Rhat = Estimation of Correlation Matrix
Res
= Residual Correlation Matrix
LR
= Eigenvalues of Correlation Matrix
AR
= Eigenvectors of Correlation Matrix
f
= number of retained factors

function [FS,FL,h2,PSI,R,Rhat,Res,LR,AR,f] = FA_MD(base,data)
tic
20 % if only one variable is assigned, assume no baseline data matrix
if nargin == 1
data=base;
end
% create normalized matrices and if no variance exists in column,
% change to random noise to correct singularity problems later
maxout = max(base);
stand = std(base);
for n = 1:size(base,2)
30
if stand(n) <= 0.00000000001
base(:,n) = rand(size(base,1),1);
else
base(:,n) = base(:,n)/maxout(n);
end
end
maxout = max(data);
stand = std(data);
for n = 1:size(data,2)
if stand(n) <= 0.00000000001
40
data(:,n) = rand(size(data,1),1);
else
data(:,n) = data(:,n)/maxout(n);
end
end
% Find Mean (M), then center (XD) data:
M = mean(base);
E = diag(ones(size(data,1)));
XD = data - E * M;
50 % calculate Covariance matrix (R) and find eigenvalues (LR) and eigenvectors (AR)
R = corr(base);
[AR,LR] = eig(R);
AR = fliplr(AR);
LR = fliplr(flipud(LR));
% display eigenvalues in descending order
z = diag(LR)';
% retain eigenvectors that contain 80% of variance
60 r = 0;
p = 0;
zs = sum(z);
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while p <= .8
r = r + 1;
p = p + z(1,r)/zs;
end
AR = AR(:,1:r);
LR = LR(1:r,1:r);
70 % determine how many factors to keep (f) by iterating until average
% commonality (h2) is greater than 0.8 or all factors are included
[m,n] = size(LR);
h2 = sparse(n,n);
f = 1;
while (trace(h2))/n < .8 && n >= f

80

% calculate loading matrix (FL) and rotate to maximize variance
for j = 1:f
FL(:,j) = sqrt(LR(j,j))*AR(:,j);
end
if f > 1
FL = rotatefactors(FL,'method','orthomax','maxit',2000);
end
% calculate Estimated Correlation Matrix(Rhat), commonality(h2), Uniqueness(PSI)
h2 = FL*FL';
PSI = eye(size(h2)) - diag(diag(h2));
Rhat = h2 + PSI;

90

% calculate factor scores (FS) and Residual Matrix (Res)
% try different methods until you get a non-singular matrix
FS = inv(FL'*inv(PSI)*FL)*(FL'*inv(PSI))*XD';%General Least Squares
%FS = XS*inv(R)*FL;
%Regression Techniques
%N = length(X);
%FS = XS*inv((1/N)*(XS'*XS))*FL;
%FS = FL'*inv(FL*FL'+PSI)*XD';
%Min Mean Square Error
FS = FS';
Res = R - Rhat;

100
f = f + 1
end
f = f - 1;
% resize eigenvalues to match factor scores
LR = LR(1:f,1:f);
% calculate Mahalanobis Distance (MD) for each Factor Score
for i = 1:size(FS,1)
110 MD(i) = FS(i,:)*inv(LR)*(FS(i,:)');
end
% Calculate mean of Mahalanobis Distance and make into vector
o = ones(size(FS,1));
MDmean = mean(MD)*o(1,:);
% Plot MD and MDmean and label
plot(MD, 'DisplayName', 'MD', 'YDataSource', 'MD'); figure(gcf)
hold on
120 plot(MDmean, 'DisplayName', 'MDmean', 'YDataSource', 'MD','Color','r' ); figure(gcf)
xlabel('Seconds');
ylabel('Mahalanobis Distance');
legend('MD','Mean');
text(size(MDmean,1),(MDmean(1)),['MD Mean =
',num2str(MDmean(1))],'HorizontalAlignment','center',...
'BackgroundColor',[0 1 0],'Margin',2);
hold off
toc
end
130
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Appendix H – 2-way Quadratic Discrimination
1

% Perform Quadratic Discriminant Analysis on given two matrices
% If more than two matrices are required, they must be added to code
% Inputs required:
% X1,X2
= Indicator Data Matrices
% P1,P2
= Prior Probabilities
% Outputs:
% CP
% CM

= Indicator Pooled Covariation Matrix
= Confusion Matrix

10
function [CP,CM,CM1,DL] = QuadDisc(X1,X2,P1,P2)
tic
% attempt to dummy proof and avoid infinite loops, if input is not specified
if nargin < 4, P2 = .5; end
if nargin < 3, P1 = .5; end
n1=size(X1,1);
n2=size(X2,1);
% Find Mean (M) of each matrix then center (XD):
20 M1 = mean(X1);
E1 = diag(ones(n1));
XD1 = X1 - E1 * M1;
M2 = mean(X2);
E2 = diag(ones(n2));
XD2 = X2 - E2 * M2;
% create normalized matrices, if no variance exists in column, change to
% random noise to correct singularity problems later
maxout = max(XD1);
30 stand = std(XD1);
for n = 1:size(XD1,2)
if stand(n) <= 0.00000000001
XD1(:,n) = rand(size(XD1,1),1);
else
XD1(:,n) = XD1(:,n)/maxout(n);
end
end
maxout = max(XD2);
stand = std(XD2);
40 for n = 1:size(XD2,2)
if stand(n) <= 0.00000000001
XD2(:,n) = rand(size(XD2,1),1);
else
XD2(:,n) = XD2(:,n)/maxout(n);
end
end
% Calculate Pooled Covariance matrix(CP), build confusion matrices(CM, CM1)
CP = (1/(n1+n2-2))*((XD1'*XD1)+(XD2'*XD2));
50 CM = [0,0;0,0];
CM1 = [0,0;0,0];
% precalculate to speed up code
ICP = inv(CP);
DCP = log(det(CP));
LP1 = log(P1);

120

LP2 = log(P2);

60

70

80

% Calculate quadratic discriminant using pooled covariance matrix
% and compare values to fill in confusion matrix
for i=1:n1
d11(i)=(-1/2)*DCP-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))*ICP*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+LP1;
d12(i)=(-1/2)*DCP-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))*ICP*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+LP2;
if d11(i) > d12(i)
CM(1,1)=CM(1,1)+1;
else
CM(1,2)=CM(1,2)+1;
end
end
for i=1:n2
d21(i)=(-1/2)*DCP-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))*ICP*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+LP1;
d22(i)=(-1/2)*DCP-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))*ICP*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+LP2;
if d21(i) > d22(i)
CM(2,1)=CM(2,1)+1;
else
CM(2,2)=CM(2,2)+1;
end
end
% precalculate to speed up code
IC1 = inv(cov(X1));
IC2 = inv(cov(X2));
DC1 = log(det(cov(X1)));
DC2 = log(det(cov(X2)));

% Calculate quadratic discriminant using individual covariance matrices
% and compare values to fill in confusion matrix
for i=1:n1
d11(i)=(-1/2)*DC1-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))*IC1*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+LP1;
90
d12(i)=(-1/2)*DC2-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))*IC2*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+LP2;
if d11(i) > d12(i)
CM1(1,1)=CM1(1,1)+1;
else
CM1(1,2)=CM1(1,2)+1;
end
end
for i=1:n2
d21(i)=(-1/2)*DC1-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))*IC1*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+LP1;
d22(i)=(-1/2)*DC2-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))*IC2*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+LP2;
100
if d21(i) > d22(i)
CM1(2,1)=CM1(2,1)+1;
else
CM1(2,2)=CM1(2,2)+1;
end
end
%calculate discriminant loadings
b = ICP*(M1-M2)';
Dbx = inv(sqrt(b'*CP*b));
110 Dx = inv(sqrt(diag(diag(CP))));
DL = Dbx*Dx*CP*b;
toc
end
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Appendix I – 3-way Quadratic Discrimination
1

%
%
%
%
%

%
%
%
10 %
%
%

Perform Quadratic Discriminant Analysis on three given matrices
If more than three populations exist, the code must be altered
Inputs required:
X1,X2,X3 = Indicator Data Matrices
P1,P2,P3 = Prior Probabilities
Outputs:
CP
CM
DL12
DL23
DL13

=
=
=
=
=

Indicator Pooled Covariation Matrix
Confusion Matrix
Discriminant Loadings Group 1 vs. Group 2
Discriminant Loadings Group 2 vs. Group 3
Discriminant Loadings Group 1 vs. Group 3

function [CP,CM,CM1,DL12,DL23,DL13] = QuadDisc3(X1,X2,X3,P1,P2,P3)
%attempt to dummy
if nargin < 6, P3
if nargin < 5, P2
if nargin < 4, P1
20 n1=length(X1);
n2=length(X2);
n3=length(X3);

proof and avoid infinite loops, if inputs are not specified
= 1/3; end
= 1/3; end
= 1/3; end

% Find Mean (M) of each matrix then center (XD):
M1 = mean(X1);
E1 = diag(ones(n1));
XD1 = X1 - E1 * M1;
M2 = mean(X2);
E2 = diag(ones(n2));
30 XD2 = X2 - E2 * M2;
M3 = mean(X3);
E3 = diag(ones(n3));
XD3 = X3 - E3 * M3;
%Calculate Pooled Covariance matrix(CP), confusion matrices(CM, CM1)
CP = (1/(n1+n2+n3-3))*((XD1'*XD1)+(XD2'*XD2)+(XD3'*XD3));
CM = [0,0,0;0,0,0;0,0,0];
CM1 = [0,0,0;0,0,0;0,0,0];
40 % Calculate quadratic discriminant using pooled covariance matrix
% and compare values to fill in confusion matrix
for i=1:n1
d11=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+log(P1);
d12=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+log(P2);
d13=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M3(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X1(i,:)-M3(1,:))'+log(P3);
if d11 > d12 && d11 > d13
CM(1,1)=CM(1,1)+1;
elseif d12 > d11 && d12 > d13
CM(1,2)=CM(1,2)+1;
50
else
CM(1,3)=CM(1,3)+1;
end
end
for i=1:n2
d21=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+log(P1);
d22=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+log(P2);
d23=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M3(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X2(i,:)-M3(1,:))'+log(P3);
if d21 > d22 && d21 > d23
CM(2,1)=CM(2,1)+1;
60
elseif d22 > d21 && d22 > d23
CM(2,2)=CM(2,2)+1;
else
CM(2,3)=CM(2,3)+1;
end
end
for i=1:n3
d31=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X3(i,:)-M1(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X3(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+log(P1);
d32=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X3(i,:)-M2(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X3(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+log(P2);
d33=(-1/2)*log(det(CP))-(1/2)*(X3(i,:)-M3(1,:))*inv(CP)*(X3(i,:)-M3(1,:))'+log(P3);
70
if d31 > d32 && d31 > d33
CM(3,1)=CM(3,1)+1;
elseif d32 > d31 && d32 > d33
CM(3,2)=CM(3,2)+1;
else
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CM(3,3)=CM(3,3)+1;
end
end
% Calculate quadratic discriminant using individual covariance matrices
% and compare values to fill in confusion matrix
80 for i=1:n1
d11=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X1)))-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))*inv(cov(X1))*(X1(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+log(P1);
d12=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X2)))-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))*inv(cov(X2))*(X1(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+log(P2);
d13=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X3)))-(1/2)*(X1(i,:)-M3(1,:))*inv(cov(X3))*(X1(i,:)-M3(1,:))'+log(P3);
if d11 > d12 && d11 > d13
CM1(1,1)=CM1(1,1)+1;
elseif d12 > d11 && d12 > d13
CM1(1,2)=CM1(1,2)+1;
else
CM1(1,3)=CM1(1,3)+1;
90
end
end
for i=1:n2
d21=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X1)))-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))*inv(cov(X1))*(X2(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+log(P1);
d22=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X2)))-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))*inv(cov(X2))*(X2(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+log(P2);
d23=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X3)))-(1/2)*(X2(i,:)-M3(1,:))*inv(cov(X3))*(X2(i,:)-M3(1,:))'+log(P3);
if d21 > d22 && d21 > d23
CM1(2,1)=CM1(2,1)+1;
elseif d22 > d21 && d22 > d23
CM1(2,2)=CM1(2,2)+1;
100
else
CM1(2,3)=CM1(2,3)+1;
end
end
for i=1:n3
d31=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X1)))-(1/2)*(X3(i,:)-M1(1,:))*inv(cov(X1))*(X3(i,:)-M1(1,:))'+log(P1);
d32=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X2)))-(1/2)*(X3(i,:)-M2(1,:))*inv(cov(X2))*(X3(i,:)-M2(1,:))'+log(P2);
d33=(-1/2)*log(det(cov(X3)))-(1/2)*(X3(i,:)-M3(1,:))*inv(cov(X3))*(X3(i,:)-M3(1,:))'+log(P3);
if d31 > d32 && d31 > d33
CM1(3,1)=CM1(3,1)+1;
110
elseif d32 > d31 && d32 > d33
CM1(3,2)=CM1(3,2)+1;
else
CM1(3,3)=CM1(3,3)+1;
end
end
%calculate discriminant loadings
%Group 1 vs group 2
CP12 = (1/(n1+n2-2))*((XD1'*XD1)+(XD2'*XD2));
120 b = inv(CP12)*(M1-M2)';
Dbx = inv(sqrt(b'*CP12*b));
Dx = inv(sqrt(diag(diag(CP12))));
DL12 = Dbx*Dx*CP12*b;
%Group 2 vs group 3
CP23 = (1/(n2+n3-2))*((XD2'*XD2)+(XD3'*XD3));
b = inv(CP23)*(M2-M3)';
Dbx = inv(sqrt(b'*CP23*b));
Dx = inv(sqrt(diag(diag(CP23))));
130 DL23 = Dbx*Dx*CP*b;
%Group 1 vs group 3
CP13 = (1/(n1+n3-2))*((XD1'*XD1)+(XD3'*XD3));
b = inv(CP13)*(M1-M3)';
Dbx = inv(sqrt(b'*CP13*b));
Dx = inv(sqrt(diag(diag(CP13))));
DL13 = Dbx*Dx*CP*b;
end
140
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Appendix J – Nov21 Test Plan
Run Activity Malware
#
Level
Present
1
2
N
2
2
N
3
1
Y
4
2
Y
5
1
Y
6
2
N
7
1
N
8
2
Y
9
2
N
10
1
N
11
2
Y
12
1
Y
13
3
N
14
3
Y
15
1
N
16
3
N
17
3
N
18
2
Y
19
3
Y
20
2
Y
21
1
N
22
3
Y
23
1
Y
24
2
N
25
1
Y
26
3
Y
27
3
N
28
3
N
29
3
Y
30
1
N
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